On 14 April 2015 at 09:47, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] >> Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body >> is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were >> created, both would think they were me. >> >> It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could be for >> example, that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is necessary >> (why not...) for being that particular individual... as my current body even >> if all its matter is continuously replaced, it is not replaced in one go, it >> is as said "continuous", all matter composing my body is causaly linked... >> I'm not saying it is like that and that computationalism/functionalism is >> false (well I believe in computationalism), but currently, as we're nowhere >> near to have the ability to make copies of ourselves... it's hard to say, >> and as we have no 3rd persons reproduceable and sharable test to be >> convinced that the copy would really be us (we only have a metaphysical >> believe and a theory to say it should be)... even if that copy was made of >> flesh and blood and that a super high res scan would show that it has the >> exact same atoms with the exact same properties as the living body it was >> copied from... we would still have no proof it would be the same person... >> we would have a theory that if we succeed to "copy" a person and if the >> resulting copied person was alive and well and claimed to be the same as the >> "original" that indeed the copy and the copied would be the same person... >> but that is not a proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). >> We would have evidences that it must be (like the copy claiming he is the >> same as the original), but that's all we would have, only the "copy" would >> really *knows* it... like in a quantum suicide experiment, only the >> experimenter staying alive would have more and more confidence, quantum >> suicide is true. > > > That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' > account of personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity > despite the gradual replacement of the cells in one's body. The problems > arise when there is a tie between two copies for the role of 'closest' > continuer. If I kill one of the copies, have I actually killed a person?
There are other problems with the "closest continuer" account. For example, what if one copy differs in mental content by 1% and the other by 2%: is it reasonable to say that one is the continuation of the person and the other not? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
