On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 11:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>: >> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List < >>>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: >>>>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Telmo Menezes >>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM >>>>>> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett < >>>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, >>>>>> and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and >>>>>> duplicating machines play merry havoc with our intuitive notions of >>>>>> personal identity. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, it simply vanish. Personal identity is an illusion, but the FPI >>>>>> is not, and that result is not used in the reversal, so I prefer to let >>>>>> is >>>>>> for other threads and topics. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That seems like a flat contradiction. Personal identity is an >>>>>> illusion but First Person Indeterminacy is not. You can't have first >>>>>> person >>>>>> anything if you do not have a notion of personal identity. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, >>>>>> with "X is an illusion." Be X consciousness, personal identity, free >>>>>> will, >>>>>> space, time, or anything else. The theory is supposed to explain our >>>>>> experience of these things. Writing them off as "illusions" is not an >>>>>> explanation. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Only if the theory fails to explain how the illusion arises. For >>>>>> example, there was a persistent illusion that the universe revolves >>>>>> around >>>>>> the earth. Astronomy eventually showed that not to be the case, also >>>>>> explaining why it looks that way. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Telmo – I agree with you. An argument for something being an illusion >>>>>> needs to show how the illusion emerges out of the underlying reality; it >>>>>> needs to demonstrate the mechanisms that drive the illusion and how they >>>>>> work to transform the actual real events/experiences/etc. into whatever >>>>>> is >>>>>> subsequently perceived as experienced or real. Simply saying that >>>>>> something >>>>>> is an illusion is not adequate; I agree with that. And I think your >>>>>> example >>>>>> of the Aristotelian earth centric universe, is a good one. The mechanism >>>>>> by >>>>>> which it produced the illusion was demonstrated in that case. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body >>>>> is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were created, >>>>> both would think they were me. >>>>> >>>> >>>> It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could be >>>> for example, that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is >>>> necessary (why not...) for being that particular individual... as my >>>> current body even if all its matter is continuously replaced, it is not >>>> replaced in one go, it is as said "continuous", all matter composing my >>>> body is causaly linked... I'm not saying it is like that and that >>>> computationalism/functionalism is false (well I believe in >>>> computationalism), but currently, as we're nowhere near to have the ability >>>> to make copies of ourselves... it's hard to say, and as we have no 3rd >>>> persons reproduceable and sharable test to be convinced that the copy would >>>> really be us (we only have a metaphysical believe and a theory to say it >>>> should be)... even if that copy was made of flesh and blood and that a >>>> super high res scan would show that it has the exact same atoms with the >>>> exact same properties as the living body it was copied from... we would >>>> still have no proof it would be the same person... we would have a theory >>>> that if we succeed to "copy" a person and if the resulting copied person >>>> was alive and well and claimed to be the same as the "original" that indeed >>>> the copy and the copied would be the same person... but that is not a >>>> proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). We would have >>>> evidences that it must be (like the copy claiming he is the same as the >>>> original), but that's all we would have, only the "copy" would really >>>> *knows* it... like in a quantum suicide experiment, only the experimenter >>>> staying alive would have more and more confidence, quantum suicide is true. >>>> >>> >>> Physics is irrelevant to the philosophical problem of personal >>> identity. It is only required that consciousness be logically >>> duplicable. If my body is destroyed and another similar body is created, >>> perhaps by miraculous means >>> >> >> If miracles come into play... yeah, anything is possible. But I disagree, >> it's not *only* a logical problem. Avec des si, on mettrait Paris en >> bouteille. >> >> What you're saying is tautological and can be summarized by "If >> consciousness can be duplicated, consciousness can be duplicated"... while >> it's true, I don't see anything interesting in that statement. >> > > Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a > matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a > question as to whether we could do it with a computer or with chemicals, > but that does not have any bearing on the philosophical problem of personal > identity. It might be useful if you or Bruce could provide a formal definition of the problem of personal identity. Is personal identity anything more than a bunch of information -- memories and learned behaviors? If it is just that, then it seems obvious to me that, if you duplicate a person, both copies will have exactly the same personal identity at the moment they are created and start to diverge immediately after. Even if some protocol is used to keep both copies experiencing exactly the same stimuli, there are still two first person views. I don't think that a first person view and a personal identity are the same thing. Telmo. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
