On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>: > >> >> >> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected] >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *From:* [email protected] [mailto: >>>>> [email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Telmo Menezes >>>>> *Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM >>>>> *To:* [email protected] >>>>> *Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>> >>>>> The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, >>>>> and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and >>>>> duplicating machines play merry havoc with our intuitive notions of >>>>> personal identity. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, it simply vanish. Personal identity is an illusion, but the FPI >>>>> is not, and that result is not used in the reversal, so I prefer to let is >>>>> for other threads and topics. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That seems like a flat contradiction. Personal identity is an illusion >>>>> but First Person Indeterminacy is not. You can't have first person >>>>> anything >>>>> if you do not have a notion of personal identity. >>>>> >>>>> I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, >>>>> with "X is an illusion." Be X consciousness, personal identity, free will, >>>>> space, time, or anything else. The theory is supposed to explain our >>>>> experience of these things. Writing them off as "illusions" is not an >>>>> explanation. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only if the theory fails to explain how the illusion arises. For >>>>> example, there was a persistent illusion that the universe revolves around >>>>> the earth. Astronomy eventually showed that not to be the case, also >>>>> explaining why it looks that way. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Telmo – I agree with you. An argument for something being an illusion >>>>> needs to show how the illusion emerges out of the underlying reality; it >>>>> needs to demonstrate the mechanisms that drive the illusion and how they >>>>> work to transform the actual real events/experiences/etc. into whatever is >>>>> subsequently perceived as experienced or real. Simply saying that >>>>> something >>>>> is an illusion is not adequate; I agree with that. And I think your >>>>> example >>>>> of the Aristotelian earth centric universe, is a good one. The mechanism >>>>> by >>>>> which it produced the illusion was demonstrated in that case. >>>>> >>>>> Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body >>>> is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were created, >>>> both would think they were me. >>>> >>> >>> It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could be >>> for example, that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is >>> necessary (why not...) for being that particular individual... as my >>> current body even if all its matter is continuously replaced, it is not >>> replaced in one go, it is as said "continuous", all matter composing my >>> body is causaly linked... I'm not saying it is like that and that >>> computationalism/functionalism is false (well I believe in >>> computationalism), but currently, as we're nowhere near to have the ability >>> to make copies of ourselves... it's hard to say, and as we have no 3rd >>> persons reproduceable and sharable test to be convinced that the copy would >>> really be us (we only have a metaphysical believe and a theory to say it >>> should be)... even if that copy was made of flesh and blood and that a >>> super high res scan would show that it has the exact same atoms with the >>> exact same properties as the living body it was copied from... we would >>> still have no proof it would be the same person... we would have a theory >>> that if we succeed to "copy" a person and if the resulting copied person >>> was alive and well and claimed to be the same as the "original" that indeed >>> the copy and the copied would be the same person... but that is not a >>> proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). We would have >>> evidences that it must be (like the copy claiming he is the same as the >>> original), but that's all we would have, only the "copy" would really >>> *knows* it... like in a quantum suicide experiment, only the experimenter >>> staying alive would have more and more confidence, quantum suicide is true. >>> >> >> Physics is irrelevant to the philosophical problem of personal >> identity. It is only required that consciousness be logically >> duplicable. If my body is destroyed and another similar body is created, >> perhaps by miraculous means >> > > If miracles come into play... yeah, anything is possible. But I disagree, > it's not *only* a logical problem. Avec des si, on mettrait Paris en > bouteille. > > What you're saying is tautological and can be summarized by "If > consciousness can be duplicated, consciousness can be duplicated"... while > it's true, I don't see anything interesting in that statement. > Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a question as to whether we could do it with a computer or with chemicals, but that does not have any bearing on the philosophical problem of personal identity. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
