On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>> LizR wrote:
>>
>>> On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the
>>>     measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are
>>>     the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI
>>>     advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have
>>>     failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been
>>>     pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before
>>>     you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule.
>>>     The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent.
>>>
>>> In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out
>>> that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have
>>> 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the
>>> branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work.
>>>
>>> My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago
>>> now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of
>>> the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies
>>> on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into
>>> account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a
>>> lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting,
>>> at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates
>>> at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I
>>> thought).
>>>
>>
>> I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of
>> quantum probabilities.
>>
>>  Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement
>>> is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational
>>> number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of
>>> branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to
>>> results with irrational numbered probabilities?
>>>
>>
>> Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value
>> between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a
>> spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle
>> alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second
>> magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value
>> in the range.
>>
>
> One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally
> likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches;
> but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to
> achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the
> perturbation the larger the number required.  Of course the number required
> is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but
> in principle it goes as 1/epsilon.
>
> I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are
> arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this
> provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble.  But this somewhat begs the question
> of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be
> equal since we have lost the justification of symmetry.  I think this is
> "the measure problem".
>

I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of
rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised
then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no
measure problem.

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