On 4/8/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:

The main point is that for a physical universe to exists in some primary form, you have to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable.

Not so. You essentially admit as much in the 'yes doctor' scenario. If you are happy to replace your physical brain with one simulated in a computer, then you are saying that the physical brain is Turing emulable. This stands to reason if you believe that the brain is essentially classical in its operation -- it is large and warm so quantum effects decohere far too rapidly to have any significant large-scale effect. The operation of this physical object is then completely classical, and determined by physical laws that are deterministic. If you know the laws and the initial conditions, then the future activity of that brain can be completely calculated on a computer.

The problem, of course, arises with the requirement that you know, or can determine, the initial conditions. I suggest that this is impossible in principle. Physical limitations are such that in any attempt to extract a complete map of the state of a living brain at any instant, the machinery would destroy the brain *before* any such map could be completed.

'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons.

This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person.

And not only because of initial conditions, but also because of interaction with the environment. This can't be negligble, because it is what makes the computations of the brain classical (or nearly so) and besides the incidental interactions I think perception is also necessary. Both of these will cause any replicated brain to instantly diverge from it's original.

I am actually interested in Bruno's idea of consciousness; but I'm not clear on whether there is anything useful in axiomatically defining knowledge in terms of provability. What does that tell me about whether my Mars Rover is conscious or not?

Brent


But whether these means that consciousness is primarily computational or primarily physical is just a matter of which way the rabbit jumps.

Bruce


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