On 09 Apr 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:
On 4/8/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons.

This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person.
And not only because of initial conditions, but also because of interaction with the environment. This can't be negligble, because it is what makes the computations of the brain classical (or nearly so) and besides the incidental interactions I think perception is also necessary. Both of these will cause any replicated brain to instantly diverge from it's original.

I think this is where Bruno appeals to FPI. But I think it is also why you say that we need to simulate some or all of the environment as well as the brain itself if we are to make sense of personal survival.

At the moment, Bruno's dovetailer cannot do this because it picks out only 'conscious moments' and does not find them only in reproducible environments. There is no physics there, so Boltzmann brains outnumber 'people' by infinity to one.

Proof?

If that is the cse, then computationalism is false. But you need more than the 'number' of realization is arithmetic, you need to define the "inside views" or the person points of view. This add the constraints whioch up to now show that we have a non trivial physics. I guess I might explain more on this later.

Bruno




Bruce

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