On 16 Apr 2015, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
wrote:
Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific
finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific
observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation.
In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.
Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis
of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)
And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as
much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.
But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it,
his theory in outline is:
1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by
computed relations between the computed physics
Computed or not.
and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds
which he hopes to show have "low measure".
Well, better to talk in term of the continuations. The indeterminacy
is relative, for the physics. There is another more geographical
indterminacy, which is more Bayesian, like if there are carbon atoms,
I have to find myself in a reality with carbon maker (like stars).
That indeterminacy still requires a notion of normal (Gaussian)
reality, and thus a solution to the general measure problem.
Rather good summary Brent!
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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