On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Apr 2015, at 01:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated,
would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill?
It can be shown that, indeed, "killing" someone with comp is
equivalent with an amnesia. Dying is forgetting or refreshing
memories.
If you decide to kill a copy, you have to cautiously agree (with
yourself) on the procedure (and who will be killed) before the
duplication. After the duplication, it is preferable to treat the
copy as a new person, for all practical and ethical purposes.
I think there are even stronger reasons for treating copies as new
persons. In practical terms, if it came to ethical and legal
matters, the law is currently no able to recognize the existence
of two separate bodies as the same person. And physically, I think
the divergence necessitated by different physical bodies in
different spatial locations is going to lead to significant
divergence sufficiently rapidly for the concept of 'the same
person' to cease to be applicable after an extremely short time.
The effects of simple thermal noise would be sufficient for the
'persons' to decohere within milliseconds.
No problem with this.
I think that the discussion between Stathis and Quentin relies on a
confusion between the 3-1 views and the 1-views. We cannot
duplicate the 1-views (= the 1-1-views = the 1-1-1-views): we feel
always unique. But in the 3-1 view we can ascribe the same
consciousness to (identical) exemplars, and this can play a rôle in
the measure problem, although this needs some later differentiation
and the rule Y = II. In practice, "thermal noise" will indeed
"decohere" the consciousness very quickly. I use quote as we are
not in the quantum setting here, but it is (here) the same thing.
But the question of the number of person is a different discussion.
If you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in
W, is the same person as the guy in M, who marries a woman in M,
are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are already
all the same person, despite different lives and consciousness.
But then you're just mucking up the meaning of "the same person",
giving it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common
usage.
I just said that IF you take the M and W man as being the same person,
then we are all the same person. Nothing more. Personal identity is
not in my topics here. I am interested in that topic, but I avoid it
in the whole work, as it is difficult, and the result are quite
counter-intuitive. Fortunately we don't need them at all to get the
fact that if comp is true, physics has to emerge from addition and
multiplication, without adding anything.
Bruno
Brent
Here there is a matter of almost conventional decision, to relate
or not individuality to personal identity. With comp and AUDA, we
can say we are all the "universal baby" describes by the 8
arithmetical hypostases, so we are the same person, put in (quite)
different context (the genes, the culture, ...). We are all the
same amoeba, in that case. If Aliens exist, we are them too.
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