On 18 Apr 2015, at 04:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/17/2015 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as
having been duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.
How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?
By associating it with different token of the machinery
implementing it.
Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having
different spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise
indiscernible set of thoughts?
No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?
I'm not sure what 3-1 view means,
It is the content of the diary of the observer outside the box
(like in sane04), but on the consciousness of the copies involved.
This is for the people who say that they will be conscious in W and
M. That is true, but the "pure" 1-view is that they will be
conscious in only one city (even if that happens in both cities).
In the math part, this is captured by [1][0]A, with [0]A = the
usual bewesibar of Gödel, and [1]A = [0]A & A (Theaetetus).
but if you mean in the sense of running on two different machines
then I agree.
OK.
That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on
distinguishability of the physical substrate with no distinction
in the consciousness/computation.
OK. Like when the guy has already been multiplied in W and M, but
has not yet open the door. We assume of course that the two boxes
are identical from inside, no windows, and the air molecules at the
same place (for example). That can be made absolutely identical in
the step 6, where the reconstitutions are made in a virtual
environment.
But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought
experiment?
Yes, at different steps.
I find I'm confused about that. In our quantum-mechanical world
it is impossible to duplicate something in an unknown state. One
could duplicate a human being in the rough classical sense of
structure at the molecular composition level, but not the
molecular states. Such duplicates would be similar as I'm similar
to myself of yesterday - but they would instantly diverge in
thoughts, even without seeing Moscow or Washington.
In practice, yes. Assuming the duplication is done in a real world,
and assuming QM. But in step six, you can manage the environments
to be themselves perfectly emulated and 100% identical. That is all
what is needed for the reasoning.
Yet it seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation
At my substitution level. But this will entail that the real world,
whatever it can be, is non deterministic. We "WM" duplicate on all
the different computations in the UD* (in arithmetic) which go
through my local current state.
and requires the duplication and subsequent thoughts to be
duplicates at a deterministic classcial level so that the M-man
and W-man on diverge in thought when they see different things in
their respective cities.
Yes. That is why the H-man cannot predict which divergence he will
live. But sometimes we mention the state of the person before he or
she open the doors, for example to address a question like "would a
tiny oxygen atom in the box makes a difference in the measure or
not", Here there is almost a matter of convention to say that
there are two or one consciousness. We can ascribe consciousness to
the different people in the different box, but that is a 3-1 view.
The 1-views feels to be in once city, and not in the other.
No, things like radioactive decay of K40 atoms is the blood will
very quickly cause the W-man and M-man to diverge no matter how
precisely the duplicate recievers are made.
I agree.
But I'm not sure why this would matter to your argument? Is it
important to the argument that they diverge *only* because of a
difference in perception?
Normally they should diverge, if they have a different future (despite
having the same perception before the divergence), by the rule Y = II.
But it is an open problem, and I use the self-reference logic to go
around that problem, and to avoid question like that. I will think
about finding a thought experience which leads to different answers
for the probability if we accept or not the Y = II. I have some in my
note, but I have not really the time now. (The deadline for my paper
is Monday, but I have my course today, + some paper to review, also.
In few days I will have more time). It is not very important for the
present thread----we have discussed this a long time ago: as long as
the perception is identical, you can fuse the person again, and I want
to avoid something like making the measure dependent of the diameter
of the neuron axons).
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.