> No, I am not. Cats are made of matter, but not all things made of matter are cats -- some are dogs, some are rocks, and so on.
I think the major thrust here is not that you need a miracle to get consciousness out of matter, although that is part of what Bruno is saying. Instead, his point is that you need God to explain the *existence* of matter. That "God" really instantiated matter computations while other computations in Platonia are fictions is what attention is being called to. On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> There are two things. >> >> 1) the mathematical facts, well known by the experts (who even asked me >> to suppress any explanation on that as it is trivial for anybody having >> grasp the ten first hours of course in that matter) that the notion of >> computability is mathematical, with CT, and even arithmetical, actually >> sigma_1 arithmetical. here we dispense with physics, like we dispense with >> physics in any branch of math, except of course when they are used or >> applied to physical problems. >> > > The notion of computability might very well be mathematical. That does not > mean that a computation can be performed without some physical activity. If > it is so elementary and simple to show that the notion of computability is > mathematical and does not require reference to physical computers, then > argue it here in simple terms. I do not claim to be expert in computer > science, or in the theory of computation, so you should be able to > enlighten me. > > If a non-physicist shows that they do not really understand the Standard > Model of particle physics, or the Higgs mechanism, then I attempt to > explain it to the in simple terms. I may or may not succeed, but I do not > simply dismiss the enquirer by telling them to go and read some text books. > Real teachers do not behave like that. > > > 2) Neither comp, nor MGA ever *assumes* that the physical substrate can >> be dispensed with. >> > > Actually, in MGA it is an assumption since the argument is only that it is > considered absurd that the film projected on to the computer substrate > would still reproduce the conscious experience (since the film is not > counterfactually correct). But this is not absurd at all, since the movie > allows the original states to be produced exactly as if the original brain > were intact. There is no force of logic in the argument, so it is > ultimately an assumption that the physical substrate can be dispensed with > -- it has not been proved since the film projection in the MGA is still a > physical operation and it still maintains the conscious experience. > > > > You are the one invoking some God which has to intervene to make a >> computation more real than others. >> > > No, I am not. Cats are made of matter, but not all things made of matter > are cats -- some are dogs, some are rocks, and so on. In the same way the > physical activity of atoms in stars do not produce consciousness, but the > physical activity of similar atoms and molecules in brains do produce > consciousness. I do not need to appeal to god to differentiate between > stars and brains. Matter in stars has the property of sustaining nuclear > fusion reactions: matter in the brain has the property of sustaining > conscious thoughts. The one is no more mysterious than the other. You are > the one who introduces sufficient obfuscation around the fact of > consciousness that you need to invoke some god to distinguish a computation > that leads to consciousness from the computation that leads to the number > 127. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/Lp5_VIb6ddY/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
