On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that
mathematics is incapable of handling 4 coordinates?
> Of course, applied mathematics exists, and you can represent event
in mathematics, but you shopuld not confuse something (a physical
event) and its mathematical representation.
I am not confusing that but I think sometimes you might be confusing
a physical thing with the language (mathematics) the descriptive
representation of the thing is presented in. Or maybe not, maybe
you're right and mathematics is more than just a language and is
more fundamental than physics; nobody knows including you.
Nobody can know. But we can reason from hypothesis. With the
computationalist hypothesis, the immateriality of consciousness is
contagious on the possible environment. Nobody pretends this is
obvious, especially for people stuck at the step 3.
>> but if something requires an infinite number of steps to
determine what it will do its not very deterministic.
> It is, when you agree to apply the excluded middle on the
arithmetical proposition, or actually it is enough to believe that a
closed Turing machine stop or does not stop.
Deterministic perhaps, but not predictable even in theory.
OK, but that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true
sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set
can be defined in standard set theory or second-order arithmetic
(analysis).
>>> Bullshit. I have never argued anything about "comp1" and never
will because I'm sick to death with "comp" of any variety.
>> In some post you argued once that comp1 is trivial,
> ?
!
> I remember you said that comp as I meant it is trivially, true, is
wrong (btw). If you don't remember what you post, the conversation
might loss its meaning.
Half of your theory is true but trivial, the other half is not
trivial and not true.
You don't know the other half. You said repeatedly that you never find
the need to read after step 3. And you show to know nothing about
computability theory (which explains why the second part eludes you).
So you have read 3/8 of the simple part (done for the novice), that is
3/16 of the work, and you judged it?
As for "comp"... I have so often heard you say "according to comp
blah blah" that I no longer know what your silly little homemade
slang word is supposed to mean, but I do know it can't mean
Computationalism. And now dear god we've got "comp1" and "comp2" to
add to the mix!
That was a gentle attempt by Liz to make sense of *your* distinction
(between Computationalism (comp1) and what I explain as consequence of
it, comp2). Comp2 is computationalism when you understand UDA, and
that primitive matter is transformed into a god of the gap type of
notion, with respect to the mind-body problem, or even just the body
problem.
It is not that we don't need the notion of primary matter, it is that
even if that exists, we can't relate it to consciousness in any way.
If we would need a piece of matter, either it is Turing emulable, and
it means we did not get the level right, or it is not Turing emulable,
and then, its needs just shows that comp is wrong. QED.
UDA is a question, and AUDA is the non trivial beginning of the
Universal Machine's answer, when she introspect herself enough (can
prove its only universality, in some technical precise sense).
But how foolish am I when trying someone to listen to the machine, if
that person cannot even listen to humans.
The universal machines, like babies, are born intelligent, but they
can evolve and become stupid, feeling superior, and destroying
themselves.
Bruno
John K Clark
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