On 6/15/2015 12:40 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 6/14/2015 8:08 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 June 2015 at 14:19, Russell Standish <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
It is plausible that regularities are a required feature of
conscious existence
This seems very likely, but it does assume something like a string landscape in which
some regions don't contain regularities. Or to put it another way, regions in which
maths doesn't work. This seems to be out-Tegmarking Tegmark, who assumes that at
least maths is (meta-) universal.
At this stage, it's no worse than assuming meaning generation is a
necessary feature of existence, and that this can only take place by
compression of regularities, which is the Solomonoff type answer...
That would require a source of such regularities, surely? But that would seem to lead
straight back to requiring that maths works.
However, neither does Bruno's theory does not offer any explanation for the
'uniformity of nature'. He has to appeal to religion to magic away the 'white
rabbits'. According to Bruno's account, the physical world is not even Turing emulable
-- which one would think would be a requirement for regularities that could be
described by physical laws. (If the physical laws are not computable, in what sense
could one describe them as laws?)
The randomness of QM is not computable. Bruno's idea is like MIW, indefinitely many
worlds are computed/emulated in parallel and in the Born rule proportion.
The Schroedinger equation is perfectly computable. The many worlds of MWI are computable
-- we have 1p inderminacy, but we have been assured that that is all part of the
dovetailer -- totally computable.
If you have a countable infinity of worlds, then they, as a totality they are not
computable. That's what the UDA does. It never stops so it produces an countable
infinity of worlds - at least that's how I understand Bruno's idea. So it fits with the
Multiple Independent Worlds model.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
