On 17 Jun 2015, at 17:56, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> "You" are the person reading this sentence
>> OK, but then it would be meaningless to talk about what "you"
will do tomorrow because "you" will not be reading that sentence
tomorrow. So if Stathis Papaioannou wants to talk about the future
Stathis Papaioannou if going to need a better definition of
continuity; John Clark thinks a good one would be the person (or
people) who remember reading that sentence right then, and in Many
Worlds that would be lots and lots of people.
> There is an illusion that I am a unique individual persisting
through time,
How would things be different if it were not an illusion? It's silly
to try to explain consciousness by saying it's another subjective
thing like illusion unless it can be objectively explained how that
illusion is generated; I think the key to it is memory, if Stathis
Papaioannou of today remembers being Stathis Papaioannou yesterday
then Stathis Papaioannou of today gives Stathis Papaioannou
yesterday the title "I".
> even if I know that there will be multiple versions of me in
future. I hope that I will become one of the versions with good
experiences rather than bad experiences.
But that implies that only one of those versions deserves the title
of "I", and that is untrue.
That is right, but it is easy to understand that (assuming
computationalism in cognitive science) both reconstituted persons will
feel like "I" applies to only one of them. That explains why we can
call personal identity an illusion, a bit like Everett can explain the
reality of the illusion of the collapse, without having any physical
collapse. Those things are first person phenomenological experiences.
Bruno
John K Clark
You can tell me not to have the illusion.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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