On Monday, June 22, 2015, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951 > > I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear > weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute > consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair, > Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of > Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a > first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other > words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain > precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is, > than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori > sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise > of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather > elusive sort. >
It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism leads. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
