2015-06-23 18:00 GMT+02:00 John Clark <[email protected]>: > > On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where >> unfettered computationalism leads. > > > People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in "unfettered > computationalism", everybody else knows there is not one single example of > a computation being made without a physical instantiation, not even 1+1; > and nobody has even the ghost of a hint of a hunch of an idea of how to do > such a thing. >
Says the guy who can clearly doubt that matter could maybe not be ontologically primary... The same guy who says "I don't affirm that matter is primary or not unlike Bruno blablabla"... but nonetheless the only argument he always uses is that matter must be primary and round and round we go... we'll all be long dead before that circle john clark machine escapes from its loop. Again a guy who affirm he *can* entertain an idea just for the sake of the discussion and always use the same argument which is basically that that very same idea is false and cannot be discussed... surely, a person normally constituted should call such a person a liar.... (that will certainly again put in light his problem with horses arses...) Quentin > > John K Clark > > > > >> >> On Monday, June 22, 2015, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951 >>> >>> I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear >>> weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute >>> consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair, >>> Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of >>> Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a >>> first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other >>> words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain >>> precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is, >>> than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori >>> sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise >>> of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather >>> elusive sort. >>> >> >> It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may >> not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism >> leads. >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
