On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where > unfettered computationalism leads.
People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in "unfettered computationalism", everybody else knows there is not one single example of a computation being made without a physical instantiation, not even 1+1; and nobody has even the ghost of a hint of a hunch of an idea of how to do such a thing. John K Clark > > On Monday, June 22, 2015, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951 >> >> I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear >> weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute >> consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair, >> Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of >> Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a >> first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other >> words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain >> precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is, >> than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori >> sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise >> of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather >> elusive sort. >> > > It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may > not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism > leads. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
