On 3/10/2015 1:52 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between local
copies, obeying the laws of physics and information transfer, and
remote copies outside our particle horizon. The latter are of
absolutely no relevance to me here-and-now because there is no
possibility of information transfer.
Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the
Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition*
think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it
being far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no
physical connection with you.
That is still within the forward light cone, so information could be
transmitted. Information is physical. If there is no transfer of
information, there is no way one could test what the copy thought.
Alternatively, what could it possibly mean for the 'copy' to think -- I
am the person that was born in another galaxy a million years ago?
Perhaps people think crazy things like that all the time, but they are
usually put away so that they can do no more harm to themselves.
Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have
defined you were *inadequately* copied last night in your sleep. You
believe you're Bruce Kellett, have his memories, look like him, and
everyone who knew Bruce agrees that he seems to be the same guy.
However, the atoms just weren't put in place using the right
procedure, whatever that might be. What difference does the
knowledge of this deficit make to you? What difference does it make
to anyone else?
How does such an implausible scenario differ from the observation
that I sloughed off some flakes of skin during the night, some cells
died, and some new cells grew, nourished by the food I ate for dinner
last night? Minor changes do not disrupt bodily continuity, and all
these changes are subject to the laws of physics, so are completely
traceable and understandable.
Yes, but as far as I can tell you think that there is some possible
scenario where your psychological continuity is preserved in the sense
I have described but physical continuity is not preserved.
No, I don't think that. I think 'psychological continuity' is an empty
phrase when there is no physical information transfer.
For example, if the copy is made using random processes, or by
exhaustively emulating every possible human. What difference would it
make to you or to anyone who knows you if the duplication had occurred
in such a way?
You can duplicate that way all you like. But then you abandon all
possibility of connecting your computational theory of mind with
real-world physics.
Whatever arbitrary scenario you come up with, you cannot find
anything that puts any serious dent in the closest continuer theory
of personal identity, and your idea of "psychological continuity" is
easily shown to be a nonsense for copies outside our light cone.
"Closest continuer theory" is an embarrassment to philosophy. It's
something a ten year old might come up with - then a few minutes later
realise how silly it is. Sorry to put it in such blunt John Clark-like
terms.
Psychological continuity as a definition of personal identity is plain
crazy.
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
