> On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 11:21 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> On 2 Oct 2015, at 12:39 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> Could you provide your answers to questions 1 - 7? >>> No need because those questions all involve the physical transfer of >>> information, which is not relevant to purported chance "copies" outside the >>> light cone. A chance copy anywhere has nothing to do with me since, to be >>> "me", it would have to be an accurate copy of all my environment -- >>> probably including all the observable universe. "I" am not just my brain -- >>> I am a brain-in-a-body-in-a world-in-a-universe. All components are >>> necessary for personal identity. >> >> When did you come up with the idea that an adequate copy of you must include >> a copy of the entire observable universe? > I have always thought this. I am a physicist with a lifelong interest in > astronomy. In particular, the structure of the CMB is a topic of particular > interest. So for any copy in another universe to be "me" in all detail, that > copy must be able to observe exactly the same structure in the CMB. Now the > CMB is the echo of the big bang and is the furthest object that we can now > observe: it defines our "particle horizon", beyond which no data or > interaction is possible. In order to get this right, the whole universe would > have to be the same in every detail.
But why do people continue to think they are themselves even though their environment changes? > I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between local copies, > obeying the laws of physics and information transfer, and remote copies > outside our particle horizon. The latter are of absolutely no relevance to me > here-and-now because there is no possibility of information transfer. Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the Andromeda Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition* think it was you despite being made of different matter, despite it being far removed in space and time, despite it possibly having no physical connection with you. >> Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have defined you >> were *inadequately* copied last night in your sleep. You believe you're >> Bruce Kellett, have his memories, look like him, and everyone who knew Bruce >> agrees that he seems to be the same guy. However, the atoms just weren't put >> in place using the right procedure, whatever that might be. What difference >> does the knowledge of this deficit make to you? What difference does it make >> to anyone else? > > How does such an implausible scenario differ from the observation that I > sloughed off some flakes of skin during the night, some cells died, and some > new cells grew, nourished by the food I ate for dinner last night? Minor > changes do not disrupt bodily continuity, and all these changes are subject > to the laws of physics, so are completely traceable and understandable. Yes, but as far as I can tell you think that there is some possible scenario where your psychological continuity is preserved in the sense I have described but physical continuity is not preserved. For example, if the copy is made using random processes, or by exhaustively emulating every possible human. What difference would it make to you or to anyone who knows you if the duplication had occurred in such a way? > Whatever arbitrary scenario you come up with, you cannot find anything that > puts any serious dent in the closest continuer theory of personal identity, > and your idea of "psychological continuity" is easily shown to be a nonsense > for copies outside our light cone. "Closest continuer theory" is an embarrassment to philosophy. It's something a ten year old might come up with - then a few minutes later realise how silly it is. Sorry to put it in such blunt John Clark-like terms. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
