> On 3 Oct 2015, at 5:21 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 3/10/2015 1:52 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> On 2 Oct 2015, at 4:28 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> I think you are continuing to confuse the issues between local copies, >>> obeying the laws of physics and information transfer, and remote copies >>> outside our particle horizon. The latter are of absolutely no relevance to >>> me here-and-now because there is no possibility of information transfer. >> >> Remote copies are still copies. If a copy of you were made in the Andromeda >> Galaxy a billion years hence, it would still *by definition* think it was >> you despite being made of different matter, despite it being far removed in >> space and time, despite it possibly having no physical connection with you. > That is still within the forward light cone, so information could be > transmitted. Information is physical. If there is no transfer of information, > there is no way one could test what the copy thought.
Are you saying that the copy would not really be a copy until it verified this by establishing contact with the original, or that the mere possibility of establishing contact with the original is necessary and sufficient? > Alternatively, what could it possibly mean for the 'copy' to think -- I am > the person that was born in another galaxy a million years ago? Perhaps > people think crazy things like that all the time, but they are usually put > away so that they can do no more harm to themselves. A lot of people believe that they are someone else, and they are deluded, because it isn't possible in the world we live in. They would not necessarily be deluded if it were possible. >>>> Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have defined you >>>> were *inadequately* copied last night in your sleep. You believe you're >>>> Bruce Kellett, have his memories, look like him, and everyone who knew >>>> Bruce agrees that he seems to be the same guy. However, the atoms just >>>> weren't put in place using the right procedure, whatever that might be. >>>> What difference does the knowledge of this deficit make to you? What >>>> difference does it make to anyone else? >>> >>> How does such an implausible scenario differ from the observation that I >>> sloughed off some flakes of skin during the night, some cells died, and >>> some new cells grew, nourished by the food I ate for dinner last night? >>> Minor changes do not disrupt bodily continuity, and all these changes are >>> subject to the laws of physics, so are completely traceable and >>> understandable. >> >> Yes, but as far as I can tell you think that there is some possible scenario >> where your psychological continuity is preserved in the sense I have >> described but physical continuity is not preserved. > No, I don't think that. I think 'psychological continuity' is an empty phrase > when there is no physical information transfer. So this is exactly what I am asking you to consider. Someone who looks like you, behaves like you, knows everything that you know, etc. wakes up in your bed this morning. Overnight, some physical changes have occurred. If you (the person waking up in your bed) are informed that these changes consist of a few cells dying and being replaced, you are not worried. But what if you are reliably informed that the physical changes involve a random process, or something else that would render 'psychological continuity' an empty phrase, as you say. You (the person waking up in your bed) still feel the same either way, and everyone who knows you agrees you seem to be the same person. Would you go around claiming that you were not Bruce, or that you are Bruce but have experienced a psychological discontinuity, or that you haven't experienced a psychological discontinuity because it's meaningless, or what? >> For example, if the copy is made using random processes, or by exhaustively >> emulating every possible human. What difference would it make to you or to >> anyone who knows you if the duplication had occurred in such a way? > You can duplicate that way all you like. But then you abandon all possibility > of connecting your computational theory of mind with real-world physics. > >>> Whatever arbitrary scenario you come up with, you cannot find anything that >>> puts any serious dent in the closest continuer theory of personal identity, >>> and your idea of "psychological continuity" is easily shown to be a >>> nonsense for copies outside our light cone. >> >> "Closest continuer theory" is an embarrassment to philosophy. It's something >> a ten year old might come up with - then a few minutes later realise how >> silly it is. Sorry to put it in such blunt John Clark-like terms. > > Psychological continuity as a definition of personal identity is plain crazy. Psychological continuity is necessary and sufficient for a person to survive. Give a counterexample if you disagree. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
