On 04 Oct 2015, at 23:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/10/2015 2:49 am, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
> But you're assuming the copy is in an evironment
equivalent this world.
If the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite
distance away there IS a Bruce Kellet in a world with a radius of
13.8 billion light years identical to the Bruce Kellet in our
world. In fact there are a infinite number of them.
> Suppose this Bruce Kellet copy were in a world just like
this EXCEPT that everybody in his world knew him as John Clark?
If the universe is infinite and not just huge then a finite
distance away there IS a person identical to our Bruce
Kellet in every way EXCEPT he's named John Clark
not Bruce Kellet . In fact there are a infinite
number of them.
Prove it! And I mean *prove*, not just wave your hands a bit.
A proof is simple if you are willing to bet that you are not actually
infinite, although John Clark would not accept it, but this is only by
ignorance of definition. I mean, it is provable that an infinity of
copy of you are emulated correctly by the arithmetical reality, which
is already assumed in all theory on a possible physical reality.
Bruce
PS. If the copy is named 'Bruce Kellet', then it is not me, because
that is not my name!
If the copy is named incorrectly, it will not have the feeling that it
disappears. He will just have the common feeling that its name has not
been spelled correctly. In fact the copy, when seen from its first
person point of vie has intuitively no name, and that can be proved in
arithmetic/computer science if one accept some standard definition of
first person, soul or knower. Some confusion arise easily if we don't
make clear if we talk about the copy of a body (third person
describable), or the personal experience of a copy, which can be
proved lacking *any* third person description (indeed, that is what
makes the hard problem of consciousness hard).
Bruno
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