On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Here are the alternatives to computationalism, and their problems: > *Interactionism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which > [...] > Which is contradicted by experiment. In every observation a change in consciousness corresponds to a change in something physical (like a brain) and a change in something physical (like a brain) corresponds to a change in consciousness. > > > can both influence and be influenced by the physical world. > As you say that is a problem because that sounds like regular old matter to me, there is nothing " non-physical " about a soul like that. *> Epiphenomimalism (Dualism):* Postulates a non-physical soul which > [...] > Which is contradicted by experiment. In every observation a change in consciousness corresponds to a change in something physical (like a brain) and a change in something physical (like a brain) corresponds to a change in consciousness. > > > is influenced by the physical world, but which does not affect the > physical world. > I can perform an experiment right now on the internet to determine if that is true or not. After I put a period to the end of this sentence I will attempt to use my soul to effect the PHYSICAL X key on my keyboard by moving the physical key inward, if you see such a X you will know that my soul was able to change something in the physical world. X > *> Pre-Established Harmony (Dualism):* Postulates a distinct physical > world and a mental world, neither of which can affect the other, > > but through God are made to agree with one another. > In other words God is lying to us. And the universe is not 13.8 billion years old and the memories you have as a child and dinosaur bones and the cosmic microwave background radiation were all created by God 13.8 seconds ago. Even on a list of very silly theories this is one of the silliest. > > > This suffers from Occam's razor. > One of the greatest understatements of all time. *> Idealism:* Is the result of eliminating the physical world but keeping > the mental world. It cannot explain why we have succeeded in building > predictive frameworks (such as physics). > Nor can it explain how things would be the slightest bit different if the physical world were not eliminated, that is to say it can't explain what "eliminated" means. *> Mind-Brain Identity Thesis (Physicalism):* Supposes a one-to-one > mapping between mental states and brain states. > I have no trouble with one specific physical state leading to one specific conscious state, but I see no reason why 2 very different physical states couldn't lead to the same conscious state if they were computationally equivalent. > > > The theory implies zombies, > If that theory implies zombies then either that theory is wrong or Darwin's theory is wrong. I don't think Darwin's theory is wrong. *> Non-Computable Physics (Physicalism):* Holds that computationalism is > false due to conjectured (but as of yet undiscovered) operations in physics > which are somehow necessary for consciousness. > The old magic causes consciousness theory, but that will not satisfy the die hard consciousness fanboys because they will want to know how that magic works and then it would become science not magic, and even then they will not be satisfied because they will say that a step is still missing because even magic is not consciousness. > > > Penrose supposes this might be quantum theory, > Even if true (and there is no evidence it is) that won't satisfy fanboys because quantum theory isn't consciousness either. > > because he thinks humans can solve the halting problem but computers > cannot. > I disagree with Penrose on some things but he is not a fool, he knows that human beings can't solve the halting problem. *> Weak AI / Biological Naturalism (Physicalism):* The power and > generality of the Church-Turing thesis have led some, philosophers such as > Searle, and Ned Block, to admit that a computer can replicate all behaviors > associated with human intelligence, however, they think this computer would > never be conscious. > > This leads to issues such as fading/dancing qualia in cases of gradual > neuron replacement, and philsophical zombies. > If that theory is true then Darwin's theory was wrong. I don't think Darwin's theory was wrong. None of the alternatives to computationalism are worth a bucket of warm spit. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
