On 13/10/2015 10:14 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 13:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>:
On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>:
On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic
computation being responsible for our consciousness,
along with many other properties seen in physics.
Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The
double slit experiment is evidence for quantum
superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing to do
with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??????
The theory has survived numerous tests, without
being disproven, which is all we can hope for as
evidence for any theory.
Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory.
Computationalism is not. Computationalism can't even get
the basic physics right, much less explain how the
universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
Computationalism is the theory that a computer could
simulate not only the brain's behaviour, but also
consciousness. It is possible that the brain utilises
non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
be false. Is that what you believe?
You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing
emulable, and computationalism false. That would be the case
if matter is primary and arithmetic merely a formal game.
Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation
is not a material notion...
I did say that computationalism could be false....
You have to say then that computation is just an abstract
representation of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking
at if it was a computation)... then you is not "just" a
computation... "you" is matter which behaves like a computation.
Sounds reasonable to me.
Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would
not be turing emulable per se.
That does not follow.
It does as turing emulability is a mathematical notion, it does not
involve matter, so if matter is needed, then you have something more
than turing emulability alone, you need matter.
A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain made of
wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing machine. The
fact that a Turing machine can be define mathematically is entirely
secondary.
Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation
theory to justify it...
Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another
machine and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter
involve... so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point,
algorithm *can't* be used as justification of the correct working.
Who said matter was the end point? I can justify the equivalence of two
computations by pointing to the fact that they give the same numerical
output. Computations might be definable in terms of algorithms, but
more than one algorithm can give the same computation -- give the same
result for the given input.
Bruce
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