Jason, you asked 8 questions only. Some of them require volumes to discuss and I appreciate your open mind to concentrate your questionnaire to these 8 only. First: what would you call "physical"? it is our defined meaning according to that limited tiny experience we have about the world. My agnosticism accepts infinite possibilities, pro and con, it sure includes what you would call "physical' (whatever that may be). I liked to play with the 2D version as well, however I started with the 1D alternative. There was a book on that, I may find it, if necessary.
Our mind is restricted, we cannot even 'imagine' the varieties the infinite may have. Not to deny. Thanks for entertaining my words John Mikes On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 4:35 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >> wrote: >> >> >> >>>> mathematics is the best language for describing physics, but the point >>>> is mathematics is a *language* >>>> * * >>>> and >>>> >>>> physics isn't, physics just *is*. >>> >>> >>> > >>> I give an example, with arithmetic. >>> >>> You have a language, that is, symbols and grammar. >>> [blah blah] >>> Then you have the semantics >>> >>> >>> >> But semantics is about meaning, you've got to give those symbols a >> meaning, otherwise you're just talking about squiggles. And by the way, >> "=" is just another squiggle. The way we get around this problem and the >> reason mathematics and other languages are not just silly squiggle games is >> that we can point to a squiggle and then point to something in the real >> PHYSICAL world and people get the connection. Using symbols is good way to >> think about something if you can make that connection, but without the >> physical there are no semantics, its just squiggles, i >> t's literally meaningless. >> >> >> > >>> Then you have the theories, >>> >> >> And to be worth a damn theories have to be about something not just >> squiggles >> >> >> > >> Robinson Arithmetic >> [...] >> >> Squiggles. >> >> >> >>> > >>> And we are not obsessed >>> [by consciousness] >>> . We might be tired of its being pushed under the rug. >>> >> >> For every sentence about how intelligent behavior works there are a >> thousand about how consciousness works because theorizing about >> consciousness is many orders of magnitude easier than theorizing about >> intelligence due to the fact that intelligence theories actually have to >> perform while a consciousness theory doesn't need to do anything. >> >>> >> >>>> Whatever consciousness is one thing is very clear, it can't be produced >>>> entirely from the >>>> stuff at the >>>> fundamental level of reality, >>> >>> >>> > >>> Ah! Glad you saw this. >>> >> >> So you agree with me that even if mathematics is the most fundamental >> thing you still need matter to produce intelligence and consciousness. >> >> >> > >>> The notion of computation belongs to arithmetic. Only a physical >>> implementation of a computation needs physical assumptions. >>> >> >> So you agree that arithmetic >> alone is not sufficient for physical computations; therefore physics >> must have something that arithmetic doesn't. >> > > John, > > 1. Would you say other physical universes are possible having completely > different physical laws and without atoms and molecules as we know them in > our universe? > > 2. Would you agree that one such possible physical has 2 spatial > dimensions, unlike our universe with its 3 spatial dimensions? > > 3. Would you agree that one possible physical world is an infinite 2 > dimensional plane, each with cells which either does or does not contain a > particle? > > 4. Would you agree a possible physical world is a 2 dimensional plane with > cells containing particles where from one time to the next, cells update > their state (of having or not having a particle) according to some rules, > e.g. as according to Conway's game of life? > > 5. Would you accept that in such physical universes, which operate > according to Conway's game of life, that Turing machines might exist? > > 6. Would you also accept that such a Turing machine, if running a > computation equivalent to the operation of your brain below its > substitution level, would be just as conscious as the computation performed > by your brain composed of electrons and quarks? > > 7. Is this not an example of computation not based on "matter as we know > it"? > > 8. Can you imagine even simpler "physical universes" where nonetheless > computation occurs? > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
