On Monday, 18 July 2016, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 18/07/2016 7:59 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker < >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> >> [email protected] >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>> The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the original >>>> and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels that he is >>>> the one true copy persisting through time >>>> >>> >>> How would it feel any different if he weren't? He doesn't know and >>> neither does anyone else. So it's really meaningless to say he feels he's >>> the one true copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that he was >>> unique. >>> >> >> Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I can be >> radically sceptical about the existence of the world and other minds, but >> still go about life as if it matters. >> >> >> But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been said about >> Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot conclude that he is >> thinking, he can only conclude that thinking is going on. >> > > From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a thought at > this moment, not that there is an entity that has a stream of thoughts. The > entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of related > thoughts. These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a > physical substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient method of > producing thoughts with the right sort of relationship to each other, but > as the sort of duplication experiments we are considering show, there can > be discontinuities in time, space and across non-interacting universes, and > continuity of identity, which is not meaningfully different to the illusion > of continuity of identity, persists. > > > But you haven't shown continuity of identity without some substrate to > provide coherence. > It's trivial to show this. I feel I am a continuation of the person who went to sleep in my bed last night. If you now demonstrate that overnight there was a discontinuity (of whatever type you like) in my physical substrate, that would not change my feeling that I have survived the night, and hence would confirm that this discontinuity does not affect personal identity. > You have relied on a particular notion of personal identity that has some > serious problems in the examples that have been used. For instance, the > loss of transitivity of identity throws into question the whole notion of > an identity persisting in time. > If you accept that the whole notion of an identity persisting in time is an illusion it makes things simpler. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
