On Wednesday, 20 July 2016, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> >> >> On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >> >>> On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>>> The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the >>>>> original and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels >>>>> that he is the one true copy persisting through time >>>>> >>>> >>>> How would it feel any different if he weren't? He doesn't know and >>>> neither does anyone else. So it's really meaningless to say he feels he's >>>> the one true copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that he was >>>> unique. >>>> >>> >>> Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I can be >>> radically sceptical about the existence of the world and other minds, but >>> still go about life as if it matters. >>> >>> >>> But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been said about >>> Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot conclude that he is >>> thinking, he can only conclude that thinking is going on. >>> >> >> From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a thought at >> this moment, not that there is an entity that has a stream of thoughts. >> >> >> Thoughts are not "at a moment". They have temporal extent and hence can >> have continuity. >> > > It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is more easily > shown by considering a digital computer. A computation can be paused, > saved, and restarted, and if there are observers in the computed > environment there is no way for them to know that this has happened. > > > First, that assumes single computer running on a clock that keeps all the > changes synchronized so there is a each clock cycle "the state". No at all > like a brain in which there is a distributed process. Second, it's not > even clear that it's possible for a single clocked computer. When you stop > a computation there are registers to be saved and cleared; and when you > restart it these have to be reinitialized. On theory that awareness is a > kind of computation, how do we know that a computer instantiated AI would > not be aware of this in some sense. When you have a concussion you don't > have memory of what went just before the event, although there's no reason > to suppose you weren't aware of it at the time. You are aware that you > have a gap in memory, that you have been unconscious. > It would be very strange if a computer instantiated AI would be aware of a pause in the computation, since that would imply a decoupling between the AI's consciousness and the computation - like a dualist version of computationalism. > Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up > arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an experience the > computation could branch at the 200 ms point giving two different > experiences, or there could be two overlapping experiences from 0 ms to 500 > ms and from 100 ms to 600 ms. If you don't allow such overlap, and there > are only discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still possible to replace talk > of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with observer-half-seconds. > > > I not only allow overlap, I think it is essential to how a brain operates, > and that's why there are no discrete thoughts. Thoughts can form a > continuum because they overlap. > > The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of related >> thoughts. >> >> >> That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not >> fundamental. It depends on whether you look for something that is >> epistemologically primary or something that is ontologically primary. >> > > The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of brains. > >> These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a physical >> substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient method of producing >> thoughts with the right sort of relationship to each other, >> >> >> "Producing" is a funny word to use. Are you assuming there is a >> "someone" who produces the thoughts - even though the "someone" is emergent >> from the thoughts? The physical world is partly an inference and partly a >> mode of thought hardwired by evolution. >> > > In the first instance, I assume that the physical brain goes > clickety-clack, and as a result thoughts are produced. In order for the > thoughts to be strung together to form a stream of consciousness they must > bear a particular relationship to each other. Being produced by the same > brain is the familiar way this relationship is ensured, which is why a > stream of consciousness is usually associated with a particular body. > Technology can disrupt this process if brains can be physically copied or > uploaded to computers. > > > Not without breaking the string of thoughts. Of course we don't think > this is essential, we've experienced periods of unconsciousness, but that's > because we can rely on the continuity of bodies and spacetime location. > This is why I think Bruno's argument that you can instantiate consciousness > without a physical world fails. The physical and mental are inextricably > entwined. > There would be a discontinuity if you go into the teleporter in one city and get out in another, but there is also a discontinuity if you fall asleep on the train. The continuity of consciousness can remain intact despite an awareness of discontinuity. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
