On Monday, 18 July 2016, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 18/07/2016 9:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Monday, 18 July 2016, Bruce Kellett < > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> On 18/07/2016 7:59 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>>> The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the >>>>> original and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels >>>>> that he is the one true copy persisting through time >>>>> >>>> >>>> How would it feel any different if he weren't? He doesn't know and >>>> neither does anyone else. So it's really meaningless to say he feels he's >>>> the one true copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that he was >>>> unique. >>>> >>> >>> Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I can be >>> radically sceptical about the existence of the world and other minds, but >>> still go about life as if it matters. >>> >>> >>> But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been said about >>> Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot conclude that he is >>> thinking, he can only conclude that thinking is going on. >>> >> >> From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a thought at >> this moment, not that there is an entity that has a stream of thoughts. The >> entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of related >> thoughts. These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a >> physical substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient method of >> producing thoughts with the right sort of relationship to each other, but >> as the sort of duplication experiments we are considering show, there can >> be discontinuities in time, space and across non-interacting universes, and >> continuity of identity, which is not meaningfully different to the illusion >> of continuity of identity, persists. >> >> >> But you haven't shown continuity of identity without some substrate to >> provide coherence. >> > > It's trivial to show this. I feel I am a continuation of the person who > went to sleep in my bed last night. If you now demonstrate that overnight > there was a discontinuity (of whatever type you like) in my physical > substrate, that would not change my feeling that I have survived the night, > and hence would confirm that this discontinuity does not affect personal > identity. > > >> You have relied on a particular notion of personal identity that has some >> serious problems in the examples that have been used. For instance, the >> loss of transitivity of identity throws into question the whole notion of >> an identity persisting in time. >> > > If you accept that the whole notion of an identity persisting in time is > an illusion it makes things simpler. > > > That rather contradicts what you said above about feeling that you are a > continuation of the person you were yesterday. If the idea of persisting in > time is an illusion, then so is your concept of personal identity. I > thought the idea was to make consciousness and personal identity central to > the theory -- not to abolish the concept of persons. > Moments of consciousness, or observer moments as they have previously been called on this list, are in some sense fundamental. Their association into persons is a construct. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
