On 03 Aug 2016, at 19:20, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
> Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow
(or any precise time later) he will be uncertain of an outcome of a
certain experience, then he can say, today, that he is uncertain
about that future outcome.
Sure, he can say whatever he wants because being sure and being
correct are two entirely different things.
> For example, if I promise myself to buy a lottery ticket next
week. I am pretty sure now that next week I will be unsure
winning something
I've been known to break promises to myself before. If I didn't
buy the ticket I'd absolutely certain I won't win the lottery next
week, if I do buy the ticket I'd be almost certain I won't win next
week. I'll have to wait till next week to find out if in addition to
being certain I was also correct. And because you said right at the
start that people duplicating machines are not involved this time
personal pronouns can be used without ambiguity.
> or not with that ticket, so I consider myself to be uncertain
right now about winning or not the lottery next week. So I
repeat, the principle questioned here says that if at t_0 P("I
will be uncertain of the outcome of some experience at t_1") =
1 then The outcome of the experience at t_1 is uncertain
at t_0.
You can be certain and wrong, and uncertain and correct. I will
say that if I don't know fact X tomorow but I do know fact X now
then sometime between today and tomorrow part of my memory must have
been be erased. It's called "forgetting". But I haven't forgotten
you said " The question is not about duplication" and that means "I"
duplicating Machines are not involved, and that is the only reason
it wasn't gibberish when you said "I will be uncertain of the...".
OK.
So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") =
1. (Question 1).
I notice also that you did not mention that the coffee should taste
exactly the same, and I could have just propose a hot drink, we would
still have P("drinking hot drink") = 1. All right?
And you agree (question 2) that if am pretty sure that tomorrow I will
make an experience with a random/uncertain result (lottery, quantum
lottery, whatever), I can say that I am already uncertain today about
the result of that experience, assuming I keep my promise to myself to
do the experience of course (buying the lottery ticket, measuring that
spin, etc.).
Good!
Now, I will prove, assuming computationalism (alias digital mechanist
hypothesis in cognitive science), that there is a first person
indeterminacy in some still modified step 3 protocol. Then I will
explain that the modification does not change the uncertainty, and
thus proved step 3.
Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van
Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the
other reconstitution box. The key point here, is that we don't tell
you which reconstitution box contains which painting. After the
reconstitutions, the doors will remain close for some short time,
which I call delta-t_1, so that t_0 is when the guy is in Helsinki,
and delta-t_2 is the interval of time when the reconstitutions are
done, simultaneously (say) in Washington and in Moscow.
The guy in Helsinki reasons like this: by the question 1 principle,
P("seeing a painting") = 1, given that there will be a painting in
both reconstitution boxes. Now, by Digital Mechanism, both copies will
see different paintings, given that they have been reconstituted in
different boxes containing different paintings. But the difference
between the paintings differentiates the first persn experience of
each copies, and they know that. Both will see a specific painting,
like a Monet, or a Van Gogh, and both will conclude that by seiing the
painting, they have already differentiate, so that the city behind the
door is already determined. But as we have not told the guy in
Helsinki where the paintings have been placed, the differentiation is
not enough for them to deduce with certainty what city is behind the
door. The guy in Helsinki I just prove that P("being uncertain about
which city is behind the door") = 1, in the same sense of the question
one principle (if X occurs at both places then P(X) = 1).
The guy in Helsinki expect (with P=1, modulo assumption and default
hyp) to get a cup of coffee, to see a painting, and to live an
interval of time where he will be aware that the differentiation has
occurred, despite not knowing which city is behind the doors. By the
principle of the question 2, he is already uncertain about the outcome
of the opening of the door tomorrow. The delta-t_2 interval of
uncertainty is lifted to the day before.
Now, obviously, telling the guy in Helsinki that there will be no
paintings, or just telling him nothing about possible paintings, that
is, abstracting from that information can hardly provide a clue to
resolve the uncertainty of the outcome, so that the indeterminacy
shown in that modified step 3 protocol is lifted on the usual step 3
protocol.
To sum up:
Principle Q1: if x occurs at all reconstitution places, then P(x) = 1
Principle Q2: if P(x) ≠ 1 at t_2, then P(x) ≠ 1 at t < t_2.
(≠ = different)
By Q1, P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door despite
knowing the differentiation has occurred") = 1
So the guy in Helsinki is *certain* now of the experience of drinking
coffee and of feeling himself in front of a precise painting (by DM)
*not* knowing which city he is in.
We use rinciple Q1 also fortes experience of "seeing a precise
painting", given that the painting are prcise and specific at all
reconstitution places.
By Q2: the guy in Helsinki is uncertain now (in Helsinki) about which
city will be seen behind the door tomorrow in the modified step 3
protocol
Seeing the precise painting, like both copies do, does not give them
the information on which city, W or M, is behind the door, but it
ensures them that the differentiation has occurred, and that they
belong to one of the two cities.
Obviously, retrieving this (null) information will not add any
information, in both reconstitution box, so the first person
indeterminacy occurs in the usual step 3 protocol.
OK?
Can we move to step 4?
Bruno
John K Clark
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