On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication. > *Question 2*: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be > uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about > the outcome of that experience at time t. > As I explained in my previous post that is not universally true, it depends on if you have forgotten something or not. When i was in the fourth grade I had to learn the state capitals and knew with certainty what the capital of Wyoming was, and I was not only certain I was undoubtedly correct too. Today I could look it up but right now, although much time has passed, I am uncertain what the capital of Wyoming is. > > You have answered both questions positively in your posts of the 02 August > and 03 August respectively. > Yes that's true I did, and both questions involved either no duplication or identical environments after duplication so, as I also explained in my previous post, personal pronouns and the identity of the mysterious Mr. You is not important. And I might add if the environments are identical then although there are 2 brains there is only one individual because thinking is what brains do and the structure of the 2 brains are identical and the 2 environmental inputs to the 2 brains are identical so what the 2 brains are doing is also identical. > > Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence of answering > "yes" to the questions 1 and 2. > Not if YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and one YOU goes to Moscow and the other YOU goes to Washington! Then talking about *THE* FPI and the probabilities of what YOU will see after duplication is just ridiculous. And don't start the bit about the duplicating machine being equivalent to one of Everett's branching worlds because it's not. With Everett the identity of the personal pronoun "YOU" is crystal clear and can always be uniquely and unambiguously defined: YOU is the one and only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Brunomarchalian way. But if duplicating machines are around then "YOU" has no definition and talking about *THE *FPI as if there were only one is just silly. > > > do you see why it entails the FPI? > What I don't see is how *THE* FPI can exist at all in a world with person duplicating machines because the "P" in FPI stands for "person" and the person has been duplicated, *YOU* have been duplicated, all of YOU has been duplicated. All. I think your confusion stems entirely from something you said a few posts ago, something you've used as a unnamed hidden axiom from day one at the very start of your "proof": " *Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view"* If that's true then computationalism is false, but you can't use an assumption that computationalism is false to prove that computationalism is false. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
