On 06 Aug 2016, at 07:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 6/08/2016 12:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote
He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the
protocol whether he writes the name of the city in
which each diary is located in that particular diary, or if he
writes in both diaries what he sees in total, in which
case he writes W&M in both diaries. It need be no different from
my seeing one thing with my right eye and writing that down with
my right hand, and seeing something different with my left eye and
writing that down with my left hand, or writing down both things
with both hands. (This is not a split-brain experiment.)
All the things that you bring up could easily happen without any
differentiation into two separate consciousnesses. You might find
the non-locality of the unified experience a little surprising,
but that is only because you are not used to the concept of non-
locality.
I say again, even though it seems obvious to you that the
differentiation must occur,
It is just trivial, by the definition of first person experience.
That is not a suitable answer -- there is only one person
experiencing both cities.
May be. That is out of topic, and depends on what you mean by person.
If you are right here, and we keep computationalism, then there is
only one person in the arithmetical reality. You and me are the same
person, in that case. May be, but useless to get the point that if
comp is correct, physics is given by a self-referential modality.
If you were right, and using the definition I provided at the
start, we would have a situation where a guy is in Moscow, and
write in his diary "Washington". But then he did not survive
sanely, and if that is the case, P get ≠ from 1 at step 1.
Your phrasing of this is wrong. There is no such thing as "a guy in
Moscow"
Of course there is. Like there us a guy on Mars after the simple
teleportation. My be study the whole proof, as you make irrelevant,
with respect to what is proved, remarks.
-- there is a guy who is in both places simultaneously. If there are
diaries in both W and M, and one person writing in these diaries, it
is not inconsistent to write W in the M diary and vice versa --
maybe not what was intended,
With respect to what is proved, indeed.
but since it is just one person writing in diaries, what is written
is not incorrect.
As correct with me being the president of the united state.
that is just a failure of imagination on your part. Try to put
yourself in the situation in which some of the many strands of
your conscious thoughts relate to bodies in different cities.
There is no logical impossibility in this. You seem to accept that
a single mind can be associated with more that one body: "We can
associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be
(and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the
physical universe and later in arithmetic." (quoted from your
comment above.) Hold on to this notion, and consider the
possibility that there is no differentiation into separate
conscious persons in such a case (the 1p is singular -- there is
only ever just one person).
I love the idea, but it is not relevant for the problem of
prediction.
There is no problem of prediction -- there is only a question as to
whether differentiation necessarily occurs.
Read the argument. It is only on prediction. You can't change that, or
you are just out of topic.
And I am not sure it makes sense, even legally.
Why should it make sense legally? Legal systems were not drawn up to
take account of person duplicating machines.
If the W-man commits a murder in W, with your bizarre theory, we
can put the M man in prison. Your non-locality assumption
is a bit frightening. Some will say, we are all that type of human,
but not this type, etc. If you consider the W-man and the
M-man as the same person, then, all living creature on this earth
is the same person, and 'to eat' becomes equivalent with 'to be
eaten'.
Such bizarre consequences do not follow from what I have said -- not
all people are the result of digital duplication experiments.
Why not eventually, but this has no relevance at all in the
reasoning, where we assume digital mechanism, so that the M and W
man would not be aware of their existence in a protocol where they
would not known the protocol.
That doesn't matter -- they would know that they were one person,
experiencing two cities at once.
And the duplications gives a simple distinction between the 1p and
3p, and we can see, in very simple simulation, that all copies
feels 1p-separate from the others, in the protocol described.
You have still not proved this,
Read the posts, or the papers, or the books.
or given any cogent reason as to why it should be the case. You
suffer from what, in the philosophy of science, is known as the
problem of unconsidered alternatives. You simply have not considered
non-differentiation as a relevant possibility in your theory/model.
Now that this alternative has been raised, you have to give reasons
against it, or revise your original thesis.
Just read the definition given.
I hope you understand well that we assume computationalism, with an
open mind that the theory might lead to a contradiction,
in which case we would learn a lot. But up to now, we get only
(quantum?) weirdness.
You are very keen to assume computationalism, i.e., that your theory
is at least internally consistent. But I have raised a relevant
consideration that counts against the coherence of your theory.
It is not my theory.
You have not yet given any substantial argument for your assumption
that differentiation into separate persons is inevitable in the
circumstances described -- lots of assertions, but no arguments.
When opening the door, the computer in W sense W, and write W in the
diary, and confirmed W v M, and refute W & M. And the guy in M sense
M, and thus write M in the diary, like the guy on Mars, write Mars.
I have no clue of what you tlak about when mentioning that there is no
differentiation, given that we consider only the first person reports
to confirmed or refute the prediction. The rest is non relevant
philosophy, at least up to now. Your "non-differentiation" proposal
has no relevance with the evaluation of the first person
indeterminacies.
If you have a problem with the thought experiments, don't forget
everything has been formalized in the math part, so as to show
computationalism empirically testable (up to a malevolent simulation à
la Bostrom).
On 6/08/2016 2:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into
two persons is inevitable.
It is not an assumption. With the protocol and the hypothesis, the
diaries have differentiated.
Diaries are not people.
True, but irrelevant in step 3. The diaries is a good 3p notion which
can be used to distinguish the first person experience (later it will
be shown 1p plural, but 3p is here a good approximation for proceeding).
The notion of first person and third person have been defined since
long, and you were persisting in talking like if it could be
possible that the first person experience does not bifurcate,
differentiate. When we comp we admit that the only way to know is
asked the copies or consulted their opinions and experiences, and
then simple elementary logic shows that they all differentiate.
I suggested doing the experiment and determining the answer
empirically.
Actually, this has been done. But the result was obvious at the start.
Logic can only tell us what follows from certain premises, and your
premises do not entail differentiation in the described circumstances.
Of course it does. The guy survives one and entire in both places (by
comp), and thus the copies sees the different cities, and thus they
write different names of the cities in the diaries.
We admit P=1 in the simple teleportation case, then the
differentiation is a simple consequence that the robot in W sees W,
believes he is in W, and as it is in W, he knows that he is in W
(with the antic notion of knowledge: true belief). The same for the
robot in M. They are both right, they have just differentiated.
They both confirmed "W v M", and refute "W & M", as, by
computationalism, the W-machine has been made independent from the
M-machine.
Again, you merely assume differentiation, you do not prove its
necessity.
I do. If you send a version of Rover on Mars and one on Venus, they
will memorize different data. It is as simple as that.
The W-machine has no first person clue if the M-machine even exist,
and vice versa. (Or you bring telepathy, etc.).
I don't need telepathy to unify the various streams of my
consciousness --
Because you neuron have cables (axones).
to know that I am the person driving the car, talking to my wife,
etc, at a given moment. Neither is telepathy need if one person is
in two places at once.
Then computationalism is obviously false.
You can't invalidate a reasoning by changing, in the reasoning, the
definition which have been given in the reasoning.The
differentiation are obvious. In the n-iterated case, the
differentiations are given by the 2^n sequences of W and M.
You continue to assume what you are required to prove.
I assume the guy is enough sober and sane to write W when seeing W,
and to write M when seeing M. We can do the same with two rooms, and
an envelop containing a paper with 1 or 0 written on it. In that case,
being able to distinguish the symbols 1 and 0 belongs to the default
hypothesis.
Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against
computationalism. I assume it, and study the consequences.
There is little sense in studying the consequences of an
inconsistent theory: you have to defend computationalism against the
charge that it is not well-established.
Studying the consequence of a theory is the only method to have a
chance to prove that it is inconsistent.
You make very weird remarks, to be honest.
Later, I can explain that the "P=1" of 'UDA step one' belongs to
the machine's G*\G type of true but non- justifiable proposition,
which can explain the uneasiness. "P=1" requires a strong axiom,
and indeed both CT and YD are strong axioms in "cognitive science/
computer science/theology".
So derive the necessity of differentiation from these axioms.
I repeat: the question is about the result on my first person most
probable continuation, in the WM duplication. By comp, the different
observation leads to the differentiation of the first person
experience. One will see M, and the other will see W, as their diaries
will confirm. If the guy in Moscow make love with a russian, the guy
in Washington will not be aware of anything, unless telepathy, etc.
Bruno
Bruce
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