On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses
automatically differentiate when receiving different inputs.
It is not an assumption.
Of course it is an assumption. You have not derived it from
anything previously in evidence.
See my answer to Brent. It is just obvious that the first person
experience differentiated when it get different experience, leading
to different memories. We *assume* computationalism. How coud the
diaries not differentiate? What you say does not make any sense.
I have been at pains to argue (in several different ways) that the
differentiation of consciousness is not automatic. It is very easy
to conceive of a situation in which a single consciousness continues
in two bodies, with the streams of consciousness arising from both
easily identifiable, but still unified in the consciousness of a
single person. (I copy below my recent argument for this in a post
replying to Russell.) So the differentiation you require is not
necessary or automatic -- it has to be justified separately because
it is not "just obvious".
Your recent expansion of the argument of step 3 in discussions with
John Clark does not alter the situation in any way -- you still just
assert that the differentiation takes place on the receipt of
different input data.
I had thought that the argument for such differentiation of
consciousness in different physical bodies was a consequence of some
mind-brain identity thesis. But I am no longer sure that even that
is sufficient -- the differentiation clearly requires separate
bodies/brains (separate input data streams), but separate bodies are
not sufficient for differentiation, as I have shown.
That was shown and explained before and is not contested here. Please
read the posts.
That is why I introduce a painting in question 2. But let us first see
if you agree with question 1.
Do you agree that if the H-guy is told that a hot drink will be
offered to both reconstitution in W and in M, he is entitled to expect
a hot drink with probability one (assuming computationalisme and the
default hypothesis)
Do you agree that P(X) = 1 in Helsinki, if X will occur in both city?
What is required is a much stronger additional assumption, namely an
association between minds and brains such that a mind can occupy
only one brain.
Not at all. We can say that one mind occupy both brain in the WM-
duplication , before the opening of the door, assuming the
reconstitution box identical. The mind brain identity fails right at
step 3. We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the
1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the
physical universe and later in arithmetic.
(Whether a single brain can host only one mind is a separate matter,
involving one's attitude to the results of split brain studies and
the psychological issues surrounding multiple personalities/minds.)
In other words, the differentiation assumption is an additional
assumption that does not appear to follow from either physicalism or
YD+CT.
It follows from very elementary computer science, and in our case, it
follows necessarily, as the 1p is identified, in this setting with the
content of the personal diary, which obviously differentiate on the
self-localization result made by the reconstitutions.
As I have further pointed out, one cannot just make this an
additional assumption to YD+CT because it is clearly an empirical
matter: until we have a working person duplicator, we cannot know
whether differentiation is automatic or not. Science is, after all,
empirical, not just a matter of definitions.
Once you agree with P(Mars) = 1 in a simple classical teleportation
experience (step 1), then how could the diary not differentiate when
the reconstituted guy write the result of the self-localization?
No empirical test needs to be done, as the differentiation is obvious:
one copy experiences the city of Moscow, as his diary confirms, and
the other experiences the city of Washington, as his diaries confirms
too. If they did not differentiate, what would they write in the diary?
Bruno
Bruce
Here is part of my discussion with Russell:
[BK]I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two
identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of
indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is
input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead
the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In
normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we see
complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and hear
many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our
consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience
has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and
sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is most
important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level in our
minds.
[BK]I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex
ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the road,
other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be talking
to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and reflecting
on philosophical issues that are important to me. And this is by no
means an exhaustive list of our ability to multitask -- to run many
separate conscious modules within the one unified consciousness.
[BK]Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the
least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another stream
of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic structure of
our consciousness -- we will just take this additional data and
process in the way we already process multiple data inputs and
streams of consciousness. This would seem, indeed, to be the default
understanding of the consequences of person duplication. One would
have to add some further constraints in order for it to be clear
that the separate bodies would necessarily have differentiated
conscious streams. No such additional constraints are currently in
evidence.
PS. Please keep your personal comments and insults to yourself.
You are inventing this. Step 3 does not use step 7. Please follows
the thread or avoid trolling the discussion. Read my exchange with
Clark, I just give him a new proof of the FPI.
Bruce, I have to say that you look more and more like the guys who
decide something is crackpot before studying it, as your remark
have just no relationship with the reasoning proposed, and then you
confess you don't read the post, nor the papers, nor the books I
have suggested, etc.
I have just proved again, in anew way, the FPI, so read the proof,
and let us move to step 4, unless you have a genuine point against
step 3. But it does not use step 7, that is pure invention, or
total misunderstanding, or total non reading and just repeating
parrots which repeat parrots, etc.
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