On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
you say: "*Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first >>> person point of view, with or **without computationalism**.*" >> >> >> >> >> Computationalism says intelligent behavior >> >> But behavior is 3p. > > True, but intelligent behavior is all Evolution can see and yet Evolution undoubtedly managed to produce at least one thing that was conscious and probably many billions; the only conclusion is that consciousness MUST be a byproduct of intelligent behavior. > > You forget that we distinguish 3p and 1p. > I have forgotten nothing of the sort. > > I think you have not yet understood what is a "first person", > > and still less what is the first person as seen by the first person view. > Don't be ridiculous, I'm not in a insane asylum so I understand what *a* first person view is, although I don't understand what *THE* first person view is in a world with person duplicating machines, and you understand it even less well than I do. > > If it was possible to duplicate a first person view in a way such that the > first person view would notice the duplication > [...] > Huh? If the 2 first person view s were identical then how could anyone notice a difference, how could one notice a difference that the other didn't? At the instant of duplication there is no difference, they diverge only when they see different things. Are they both YOU? Is one YOU and the other not? Are neither YOU? Nobody knows because nobody knows what the hell that personal pronoun means in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment. > > > then the guy in M would be able to know, in M, if the doppelganger in W > (and vice versa) has been reconstituted, > Unless somebody told the Helsinki Man that a copy of him will be made in Washington in addition to Moscow the Moscow man would know nothing about a reconstitution in Washington nor anything about Washington at all; as far as he's concerned he the Helsinki man just walked into a machine and somehow found himself in Moscow and that's that. And as far as he's concerned he the Helsinki man just walked into a machine and somehow found himself in Washington and that's that. It may be odd but that doesn't make it untrue. > > > but again that suppose some telepathy. > Fuck telepathy. > > The quantum corresponding statement is Everett's famous: the observer does > not feel the split. > And if Computationalism is true neither the Helsinki Man the Moscow Man nor the Washington man will notice any feeling of a split or any feeling of any sort caused by the duplicating machine, although they would notice a sudden change in their environment. > > > Do you really think that you can distinguish, from an 1p view, the step 3 > WM duplication experience with the experience where you are told that you > will undergo the step 3 protocol, except that now we lie and we > reconstitute you only in M? > Wow, what a verbal salad! If you want an answer you're going to have to unpack that so I understand what the question is. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
