Dear Bruno, in my agnosticism *computationalism* (as so many other 'concepts' and 'processes') is (are?) figments of the human thinking (logic? imagination? or 'views' how we try to explain the mostly unknowable infinite Entirety) - so I cannot argue about it's (their's?) truth???, or fantasy-base (convolutedness). Math etc. is in this ballpark.
I have a linguistic version of the Latin origin "to compute": to put (things) together as by *" C O M " *and *think* about them in such way hard *" P U T A R E " * which may include* quantitative *as well as qualitative thinking. John Mikes On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 05 Aug 2016, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against computationalism. >> I assume it, and study the consequences. > > > No, y > ou're assuming at the very start that Computationalism is false and then > going on from there. > > > That contradicts directly what I did. > > > > Computationalism means that every subjective experience about you can be > duplicated by computations made with a physical system. > > > This is fuzzy, but OK. I see what you intend to mean, and I am OK. > > > > > > > > > Not almost everything, EVERYTHING. But then you say: > > "*Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point > of view, with or **without computationalism**.*" > > > Computationalism says intelligent behavior > > > But behavior is 3p. > > > can be duplicated by computations performed by a physical system, and > Darwin's Theory demands that consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence, > so your statement contradicts both the meaning of > Computationalism and Evolution. > > > You forget that we distinguish 3p and 1p. > > I think you have not yet understood what is a "first person", and still > less what is the first person as seen by the first person view. > > If it was possible to duplicate a first person view in a way such that the > first person view would notice the duplication, then the guy in M would be > able to know, in M, if the doppelganger in W (and vice versa) has been > reconstituted, but again that suppose some telepathy. > > The quantum corresponding statement is Everett's famous: the observer does > not feel the split. > > Do you really think that you can distinguish, from an 1p view, the step 3 > WM duplication experience with the experience where you are told that you > will undergo the step 3 protocol, except that now we lie and we > reconstitute you only in M? You need something like that to affirm that the > first person experience can be duplicated *from its own point of view". > > BTW, you have given contradictory answer to the question 1 in the same > week. You are currently inconsistent, so please do the correction needed, > if you intend to continue to claim that there is no first person > indeterminacy. If not, you will bring the exact same invalid argument again > and again. So let us settle this completely, or let us move to step 4. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
