On 14 Dec 2016, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 12:28:17PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Dec 2016, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 12/12/2016 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
it's just like seeing the storm as anger of the sky-god.
People experience anger, so they think they have understood
the storm. They don't understand fluid dynamics (at least
until very recently).
I recall that such a type of belief does not work. The whole
physics prediction power is based on an identity link which does
not work.
It works pretty damn well in predicting storms.
Only by assuming non-computationalism, but then it is contradicted
with evolution theory, biology. It works in practice, but is flawed
at the fundamental level. I am not saying that this or that physics
theory is not working in practice, I am saying that physicalism is
I don't see why you would say physicalism needs to be assumed to
explain the predictive power of physics.
To predict (exactly and in principle) something physical you have only
one way: to compute the relative FPI on UD*. (Which is obviously
highly non-computable, as even "W" or "M" is already not computable in
the simple self-duplication, with "W" and "M" refering to the
experiences of finding oneself in Washington and finding oneself in
Moscow respectively (step 3 of the Sane04 slide).
To get a special physicalness or a physical universe, capable of
selecting some special computations on all computations which go
through the actual state of the guy doing the physical test, you need
to invoke some non-computable element, different from the statistics
on all computations, (which, as I just said, is not computable).
Now, the probability distribution might be computable, or the logic of
the "certain events" might be axiomatisable, and indeed, is (by
S4Grz1; Z1* and X1*).
Particularly when the
whole induction process is explained quite neatly with the
Solomonoff-Levin universal prior and Bayes theorem over a multiversal
set of events that naturally arises in the context of
computationalism.
Unless the universal prior is based on the assumption of a unique
physical reality, that makes my point. If you derive the multiversal
set of events from computationalism, physicalism needs to add
something which has no role at all, from the computationalist
perspective, and yet has to have some role to not contradict the "yes"
doctor, or it has to bring some strange actions from some object
having no interaction with a machine (like in the movie graph or
Olympia).
Computationalism leads to the idea that the fundamental theory is very
elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent), and that both psychology/
theology and physics must be derived from arithmetic.
Physicalism assumes that the fundamental theory pertains on objects
which are necessarily physical objects, like strings, atoms, space-
time, energy, that is "measurable numbers". It explains the
measurability of those numbers by the existence of such objects. But
then, how could those objects select the computation without throwing
a doubt on the digital truncations that we have with digital-
mechanism? Physicalness can only be phenomenological with
computationalism. That is why we must get the "collapse" and the"wave"
from the statistics on all (relative) computations. Then, we do get a
quantum logic from this, and all we can say is that computationalism
is not refuted.
In the case "nature" would some day contradicts the physicalness
implied by computationalism, we can either abandon computationalism,
or still just infer, by keeping up computationalism, that we are in a
"à-la Boström" type of simulation, by entities wanting to make us
living in an non-computationalist physics (and have to "manipulated us
a lot").
Computationalism avoids in this way Descartes' problem that we might
be manipulated by "malin génies" (smart daemons). Lying has a cost.
Each time the simulated creature find a discrepancy between the
arithmetical introspective physics (the quantified Z1* & Al. logics)
you will have to erase its memory. If you simulated the "real
apparent" physics, the creature belongs as much in the real physical
world (of the computationalist theory: that is in all sound consistent
emulations) than in your emulator.
Bruno
wrong with mechanism/rationalism. To make physics coherent with
physicalism, you need to introduce actual infinities in both mind
and matter, and a univocal link between, which, at the level of
metaphysics or theology becomes as much invalid than an evocation to
God, which makes no sense in any theory, even theology.
--
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Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected]
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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