On 20 Apr 2017, at 22:13, John Clark wrote:


Computations need matter, so if computationalism is true then matter had to come before mind.

That is false.

Physical computation needs matter, because a physical computation is a mathematical computation implemented in a physical, material, environment.

But computations does not need matter, no more than the number 2 needs two bottles of milk to make sense.

Mathematical computations exist in arithmetic, in the sense that they can be shown to exists in all interpretations of Robinson Arithmetic, i.e. a theory which assumes only predicate calculus and elementary axioms on 0, +, *, and nothing else.

Here you beg the question of materialism by defining "computation" by "physical implementation of a mathematical computation".

To do a physical computation, you need a physical reality, sure, but you don't need that such a physical reality being not implemented in arithmetic. If that physical reality is implemented (or FPI recovered) in arithmetic, you would not see any difference, or computationalism is false, and something, in some primary matter, has a special non Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable role.


 So which ONE of us has "THE 1-p you"?

Both.

That is why there is a first person indeterminacy, given that both will see only one city, and that very fact was predictable in advance.

Bruno




 John K Clark






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