On 10 Jul 2017, at 14:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 10/07/2017 9:34 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jul 2017, at 03:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 7/07/2017 7:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Jul 2017, at 01:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 7/07/2017 12:50 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Jul 2017, at 14:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 6/07/2017 5:55 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
And assuming conscious classic digital machines, quantum
phenomenology
appears at the observed level - a result in line with Bruno
Marchal's
FPI result.
Prove it. Bruno has failed to do so -- his person duplication
thought experiments do not reproduce quantum behaviour.
Which one? Z1*, X1*, or S4Grz1? If you know about a physical
facts contradicting those theories, I would be pleased to know.
The person duplication experience just shows that physics is
given by a "sum" on all computations, seen from internal points
of view imposed by incompleteness, and until now, as modest as
the results can be, the three propositional physics are still
not refuted. I am not sure you have studied them, because you
have shown not knowing the basic theories needed to apprehend
them, so it looks you are just inventing something here.
The point that I was trying to make to Russell was the fact that
purely classical machines can exhibit consciousness means that
you cannot derive quantum mechanics from consciousness alone.
That depends on your assumptions. If my consciousness, or my 1p
experience are invariant for a physical digital substitution, in
virtue of computing, then there is just no choice in the matter.
Let me spell out the argument more clearly. If consciousness
implies that the world is quantum mechanical (one can derive
quantum mechanics from the existence of observer moments), then it
follows that consciousness is not possible in a non-quantum world
(modus tollens). But a Turing machine is not a quantum device;
OK. It is an arithmetical entity.
it could exist in a non-quantum world
Indeed, at least seen from outside, in the 0p view. OK.
and exhibit consciousness (given the appropriate computations), so
something has to give -- either the derivation of the quantum from
the existence of consciousness, or digital substitution of
consciousness (substrate independence). Take your pick.
The machine "lives", or "exists" in the arithmetical reality, in
the eyes of god (in the 3p absolute view, or in the 0p view), but
from its first personal perspective (1p view) it lives provably in
a quantum reality. Then we can test if the quantum reality of the
machine violates or not the quantum that we infer from nature.
You must not identify: "the machine is in arithmetic", with the
machine's point of view access only a quantum reality (the reality
of all computations going through its current states, below its
substitution . We need to always make clear which pov we are
talking about. The UDA showed that the physical is 1p plural
statistical. It is not a 3p view.
I don't think it is that simple.
It is not simple at all. Just finding reasonable arithmetical (like
[]p, or meta-arithmetical like []p & p) definitions is not simple at
all.
If we have substrate independence, the machine (the conscious
person) cannot tell what substrate is supporting the computations,
whether arithmetic, a quantum world, or a classical Newtonian world.
From its first person *singular* point of view.
That would seem to imply that mere consideration of conscious
observer moments cannot distinguish between these.
Which leads to the global FPI (on all computations going through my
current (indexical) state/computation. That is why by observation, the
subject can verify if the physics is, or not, a sum on an infinity of
computations. QM confirms computationalism, in this way, i.e. that we"
live in arithmetic" (so to speak), because we "see" the resulting sum
on histories, obeying formally (until now) to the self-reference
constraint.
Or else you feel the full force of the conundrum enunciated above:
if observer moments imply a quantum reality, then the machine can
indeed determine its substrate, and substrate independence is lost.
It is lost below our substitution level because the appearance of
substrate is given by a "sum on all computations", and that gives the
quantum structure. But this is a consequence of the FPI, which is a
consequence of the computationalist substrate independence.
Bruno
Bruce
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