On 12 Jul 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 12/07/2017 12:42 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 12:00:40PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Well, if that is what it is supposed to imply, then John might well
be right to have problems with it! As I have said before, there is
no analogy between step 3 and quantum many worlds -- the differences
far outweigh any superficial similarities.
I don't think you have properly elucidated what those differences
are,
other than in passing, maybe. How about concentrating on those
differences in detail - if you can show that the many worlds of FPI
are phenomenally different from the many worlds of quantum mechanics,
I don't know how many differences you need, but in step 3, a person
is duplicated, not a world. And in that scenario, I could, after
duplication and finding myself in Moscow, get on a plane and fly to
Washington and meet up with my duplicate. That sort of interaction
between duplicates is not possible in MWI (at least in its
decoherent form).
In that step 3 scenario you are right.
But the step 3 is used only to explain and define the notion of thirs
and fist person view, and to explain the first person indeterminacy.
Step 4 to 7 is needed to understand that in arithmetic too, nobody can
talk with its (infinitely many) doppelgangers in "parallel"
computational history, and why matter is not clonable, and other
qualitaitive quantum facts.
Then, to get the quantitative aspect, you need to compare quantum
logic(s) with the arithmetical quantum logics.
Also, in quantum MWI, there is no external observer who can see the
splitting as there can be external observers of person duplication
-- the copies do not have to be transported, after all, they might
both be in the same room.
You get the step 3 point, OK. But you seem to miss the steps 4, 5, 6,
7 (and 8, which is not necessary, unless you believe in magic and that
the physical universe is small).
The reversal relies on the fact that with computationalism, we *are*
at each nano-second (say) multiplied/differentiated into an infinity
of computations emulated in a (tiny) part of the arithmetical reality.
I called that the global indeterminacy, where the reconstitution
domain is simply the structure (N, 0, +, *) (not to confuse with any
theory on that structure, which plays the role of the observers and
are seen as numbers *in* that reality).
And the math confirms that we got a quantum logic. Even three of them,
and the only question is if that quantum logic define, or not, a
unique measure on the computations "seen from the 1p view, and for
this we need a mathematical theory of the 1p view. It happens that the
incompleteness phenomenon rehabilitates the theory of knowledge of
Theaetetus. Incompleteness makes provability into a rational-belief
notion, and we can define knowledge by the conjunction of rational-
belief and truth. On the proposition corresponding to the existence of
a computational continuations just that give already a quantum logic,
but we get two other one with adding constraints of consistency.
I was hoping hat such a theory would be quickly refuted, so that we
could learnj something, but that is not the case. Digital Mechanism is
the only theory which explains qulaia and quanta and their relations,
and which does not commit an ontological commitment (in a PRIMARY
MATTER, or in GOD, or something).
It is the second time that you talk like if step 3 was the last step,
or like I would have been defending the (ridiculous) idea that the
quantum superposition was literally a duplication of person's bodies
or of of worlds. It is more like a notion of infinitely many
"preparation" in the arithmetical reality (the standard model of
arithmetic). That is apparent at step 7.
Bruno
Bruce
then you are well on the way to showing a fundamental incompatibility
between computationalism and quantum theory. Then presumably, we can
perform an experiment to show which one is incorrect.
Computationalism
or QM. Worthy of a Nobel prize, I'd think.
Somehow, I don't know that the task is going to be quite so easy...
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
