On 8/14/2017 1:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2017, at 21:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/12/2017 3:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You try to help John C., but you contradict his "theory" (which is
indeed based on the 1p/3p confusion).
I suggest that the whole of step 3 is based on a 1p/3p confusion. If
the duplicated subject does not have 3p knowledge of the protocol,
he will never be aware of being duplicated. In fact, he can never
get first person knowledge of that duplication, even if he is, in
fact, duplicated.
Let's examine that a bit. Suppose I've created an AI. Could this AI
experience "being in Moscow */and/* being in Washington". I think
so. I simply provide duplicate sets of sensors, visual, audio,
temperature, etc in both M and W. Now suppose the AI consists of two
computers synchronously executing the same AI routine using the same
sensory inputs, and this AI is connected to sensors in Helsinki. Now
I switch the sensors to those in M */and/* W. The AI experience M
*/and/* W. But suppose that instead I switch one of the computers to
the M sensors and the other to the W sensors. You ask the AI, when
still connected to Helsinki, to bet on whether it will experience M
*/xor/* W. Is there a right answer?
No, because that is the "telepathic" protocol. That change nothing in
the conclusion that P(M) ≠ 1.
First, there nothing magic about the telepathy; we only think of
ourselves as having a specific location in spacetime because that's a
good model of what our bodily sensors provide us. And second, it's not
telepathic in the last case, "suppose that instead I switch one of the
computers to the M sensors and the other to the W sensors." To say that
P(M)<1 you need to know what P(M) refers to.
And of course what I was leading to is a third possibility: I switch the
Helsinki AI to M and W and THEN I switch the sensors so that one is
connected only to M and the other only to W. If you ask the AI that's
in both M and W, "What is the probability you will be in W?", what's the
right answer?
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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