On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 03:14:12PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> > >Information is in the constraints. If I know something or other, then > >this entails that some bitstrings are compatible with my existence, > >and others are not. > > But as Bruce pointed out, that's a dualist model in which "you" are > different than bitstrings and you "know" things. How would some > bitstring NOT be compatible with your existence? Aren't you > supposing that all bitstrings exist?
All bitstrings exist. Some are compatible with my (as in my current OM) existence, others are not. Otherwise, there would be no knowledge. What's the issue with trying to classify this as dualist or not? It seems irrelevant to me. In my book, I described trying to see where my theory fit into David Chalmers's bestiary of philosophy of mind positions. The answer was it fit into all categories except the "eliminative materialism" one. In particular, it could be both materialist and immaterialist (materialist because physical supervenience holds, immaterialist because consciousness was emergent), both dualist and monist (where the dualism was property dualism, not Decartes' substance dualism). I actually put this to David on the one and only lunch meeting I had with him, and he admitted his classification was for a specific purpose (which he didn't go into), and probably not at all universal. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
