On 11/27/2017 9:10 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


    On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

    On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

        On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
        On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno
        Marchal wrote:


            On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:

            You clearly have not grasped the implications of my
            argument. The idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical
            weirdness by one fact (many histories)" does not work,
            and is not really an explanation at all -- you are
            simply evading the issue.

            Without collapse, the apparent correlations are
            explained by the linear evolution, and the linear tensor
            products only. I have not yet seen one proof that some
            action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics,
            although I agree that would be the case if the outcome
            where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.

            Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they
            find action at a distance astonishing, but are unaware
            of the many-worlds, or just want to dismiss it directly
            as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice is
            really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds,
            or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like
            Maudlin said, choose your poison.


            Bruno

            Bruce


        I am new to this list and have not followed all the
        arguments here. In weighing in here I might be making an
        error of not addressing things properly.

        Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two
        spin 1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we
        really do not have the two spin particles. The entanglement
        state is all that is identifiable. The degrees of freedom
        for the two spins are replaced with those of the
        entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about
        the individual spin particles existing. If the observer
        makes a measurement that results in a measurement the
        entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement
        phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus,
        and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the
        entanglement.

        We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence
        of the entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;"
        it is blind to any idea there is some "geography" associated
        with the individual spins. There in fact really is no such
        thing as the individual spins. The loss of the entangled
        state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is
        no "metric" specifying where the spins are before the
        measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal action
        that ties the two resulting spins.

        This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is
        because we are thinking in classical terms. There are two
        ways of thinking about our problem with understanding
        whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. It could be
        that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum
        world. I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is
        they do not understand spatial relationships well; they get
        leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped up
        around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of
        it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power
        and will never be able to understand QM in some way that has
        a completeness with respect to causality, reality and
        nonlocality. There is also a far more radical possibility.
        It is that a measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a
        set of quantum states that are encoding information about
        quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's
        Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing
        machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If
        this is the case we may be faced with the prospect there
        can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and
        epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense
        not knowable by any axiomatic structure.

        Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have
        come here to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
        The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is
        whether many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's
        theorem, so that a purely local understanding of EPR is
        available in Everettian models. I have argued that this is
        not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the
        entangled singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this
        non-locality. I think from what you say above that you might
        well agree with this position.

        Bruce


    Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much
    the same problem all quantum interpretations suffer from.

    I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the
    collapse axiom) explains the violation of inequality in a way
    which avoids any action at a distance, but when we assume one
    universe, like Einstein explains very clearly already in 1927, you
    get a notion of simultaneousness incompatible with special
    relativity and very minimal form of realism.

    For me, as a logician, I consider that SWE and SWE+collapse are
    different theories. The first is local, deterministic and admits a
    local physical realism, the second is not intelligible at all, as
    the notion of observer is unclear and dualistic.

    Bruno


I suppose I don't know what WWE means. MWI is not a bad idea, but I frankly question whether it along with all other interpretations are properly scientific theories. I see no particular way that any quantum interpretation can be tested. The idea is nice in that it gives an idea of a total universe as unitary, but where the phenomenology has us moving along one particular path in a decoherence event. However, if we are to have a splitting off of the world we might think of there being a many block world perspective, where a decoherence of a quantum event splits off quantum amplitudes on all possible spatial surfaces that contain this event. This has been referred to in the past as the gemische; all possible spacelike manifolds that embed a measurement event. However, we have some ambiguity with respect to probability amplitudes associated with each path in this splitting.

And it's even worse than that.  There's not just splitting an well defined "events".  "Events" like nuclear decay and the death of Schrodinger's cat happen on a continuum.

Brent

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