On Tuesday, May 8, 2018 at 2:51:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 4 May 2018, at 12:57, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com > <javascript:>> wrote: > > On Thursday, May 3, 2018 at 8:26:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 1 May 2018, at 13:02, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> On Tuesday, May 1, 2018 at 3:53:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> It assumes? Or does it entail the appearance of the classical-like >>> structure? What you say is very interesting, but I have not yet much >>> understanding of QM+gravity. My own non expert and non rigorous (old) >>> attempt leads to … to much white holes: there should be almost everywhere, >>> but … I will need to revise a bit of differential geometry (where I am not >>> so much at ease). >>> >> >> I use the word assume to mean acquire. The system acquire more classical >> properties and nonlocality is virtually gone. >> >> >> If “acquire” means “physically acquire”, that view could be problematic >> with the computationalist assumption. But that would be long to explain >> just here. With mechanism we assume a simple classical (boolean) reality >> (arithmetic for example), and explain all non classical logics by the >> constraints of self-referential correctness, which makes all "empirical >> logics” non classical. >> >> Bruno >> > > Classicality may simply be an approximation. > > > In physics? Yes, that is a theorem in the classical mechanist theory. But > the mathematical notion of computation is classical, and with mechanism, we > cannot assume a non classical physical reality/appearance. We must deduce > it from the computations (which are executed in arithmetic, as the > logicians know since a century). > You seem to assume a physical reality, but this cannot work with Mechanism. > > > > > It may not fundamentally exist, and if it does there are then deep > questions on how quantum mechanics builds up this phenomena that appears > classical. If quantum and classical realities are separate and equal > aspects of the world, such as what Bohr maintained, then one must deal with > objective loss of quantum information. > > > Which for a computationalist would be like to assume some natural numbers > do not exist. It makes no sense at all. You might need to read my papers > for proofs of this, and have some knowledge in computability theory, > notably to understand that computation is an arithmetical notion. I can > give references. > The quantum is how the digital see itself from inside the digital. > Note that by mechanism, I mean the hypothesis that the brain is Turing > emulable (consciousness is preserved through a -digital brain transplant). > It makes physics independent of the choice of the “ontology” as long as it > is Turing universal, and that it has no induction axioms, nor infinity > axioms. Note also that the physical universe becomes NOT Turing emulable, > nor is consciousness (amazingly enough: I am aware this is > counter-intuitive). > > Bruno >
That depends upon how strongly one takes the computational analogue of computing with the quantum basis of the universe, Seth Lloyd says the universe is a computer. I am agnostic on that statement. If one were to say the universe is something like a computer and that this also computer on Platonic ideal forms, something Tegmark more or less advocates, then indeed the disappearance of quantum information would be as if numbers started vanishing. LC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
