> On 10 May 2018, at 20:05, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Tuesday, May 8, 2018 at 2:51:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 4 May 2018, at 12:57, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> On Thursday, May 3, 2018 at 8:26:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 1 May 2018, at 13:02, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] <>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> On Tuesday, May 1, 2018 at 3:53:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> It assumes? Or does it entail the appearance of the classical-like >>> structure? What you say is very interesting, but I have not yet much >>> understanding of QM+gravity. My own non expert and non rigorous (old) >>> attempt leads to … to much white holes: there should be almost everywhere, >>> but … I will need to revise a bit of differential geometry (where I am not >>> so much at ease). >>> >>> I use the word assume to mean acquire. The system acquire more classical >>> properties and nonlocality is virtually gone. >> >> If “acquire” means “physically acquire”, that view could be problematic with >> the computationalist assumption. But that would be long to explain just >> here. With mechanism we assume a simple classical (boolean) reality >> (arithmetic for example), and explain all non classical logics by the >> constraints of self-referential correctness, which makes all "empirical >> logics” non classical. >> >> Bruno >> >> Classicality may simply be an approximation. > > In physics? Yes, that is a theorem in the classical mechanist theory. But the > mathematical notion of computation is classical, and with mechanism, we > cannot assume a non classical physical reality/appearance. We must deduce it > from the computations (which are executed in arithmetic, as the logicians > know since a century). > You seem to assume a physical reality, but this cannot work with Mechanism. > > > > >> It may not fundamentally exist, and if it does there are then deep questions >> on how quantum mechanics builds up this phenomena that appears classical. If >> quantum and classical realities are separate and equal aspects of the world, >> such as what Bohr maintained, then one must deal with objective loss of >> quantum information. > > Which for a computationalist would be like to assume some natural numbers do > not exist. It makes no sense at all. You might need to read my papers for > proofs of this, and have some knowledge in computability theory, notably to > understand that computation is an arithmetical notion. I can give references. > The quantum is how the digital see itself from inside the digital. > Note that by mechanism, I mean the hypothesis that the brain is Turing > emulable (consciousness is preserved through a -digital brain transplant). It > makes physics independent of the choice of the “ontology” as long as it is > Turing universal, and that it has no induction axioms, nor infinity axioms. > Note also that the physical universe becomes NOT Turing emulable, nor is > consciousness (amazingly enough: I am aware this is counter-intuitive). > > Bruno > > That depends upon how strongly one takes the computational analogue of > computing with the quantum basis of the universe, Seth Lloyd says the > universe is a computer. I am agnostic on that statement.
I am not. With or without Mechanism, the physical universe cannot be a computer, nor the product of a computer. That would entail computationalism (my body is Turing emulable) which entails that the physical reality is not Turing emulable (see my papers, that is not obvious at all). So if the universe is a computer then the universe is not a computer. Making that idea inconsistent. But maybe, for some purpose (other than metaphysics) that could be a could approximation, especially if we talk on some quantum computer. > If one were to say the universe is something like a computer and that this > also computer on Platonic ideal forms, something Tegmark more or less > advocates, then indeed the disappearance of quantum information would be as > if numbers started vanishing. Tegmark hypothesis has been proved (since long) to be a consequence of mechanism. Weak materialism (the belief in a primary physical reality, or physicalism) is not compatible with Mechanism (the belief that my consciousness is invariant for a digital permutation made at some level). I can give reference on this. I do not claim this to be obvious. Bruno > > LC > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
