> On 27 May 2018, at 10:22, smitra <[email protected]> wrote: > > This is a physical version of what Bruno has been talking about on this list. > > With "strong AI" I mean that any simulation of a person generates the mind of > that person, and the subjective state of that person is independent of how > that simulation is performed. So, what matters is if certain computations are > performed correctly, not on how those computations are performed.
OK. The only difference with computationalism is that with (indexical) computationalism we bet this for ourselves, at some description level. That entails STRONG AI, but STRONG AI does not entailed computationalism, as, logically, it is not because a machine can be conscious that we are machine. Of course STRONG AI suggest that computationalism is true. Most of the reasoning that I have done with computationalism can be done with STRONG AI instead, and that is somehow done in the “interview of the universal (Löbian) machine. > > While this doesn't seem to have anything to do with quantum mechanics, the > MWI etc., it actually implies the MWI. I agree, with “world” left to further precision. > This follows from the assumption that whatever subjective experience is > generated by the simulation is independent of the implementation of the > physical device performing the simulation. The time evolution operator > defines a mapping from the past state of the device to the future state. This > implies that the simulation of a person in a certain state is also a > scrambled version of the simulation of that person at some time in the future > or the past. Since by implementation Independence that scrambling should not > affect the subjective experience, one has to conclude that the consciousness > of the person at any time in the future and the past is also generated by the > simulation. > > If we start running a simulation at t = 0 s and the simulation is programmed > to shut down at t = 1000 s, then at any time, the running of the simulation > generates the consciousness of the simulated person at all times between t = > 0 and t = 1000. The computer plus the environment it is in contains all the > information about the past and present, including how the computer was > powered on, the simulation was started and how the simulation will end etc. > This then contains all the information about the person between t = 0 and t > = 1000, but not before or after this time period. I will not cut the hairs. I have a slight a posterior disagreement, due to some difficulties which can be apparent only in a more precise rendering of this, which is that consciousness is not produce by a simulation of brain, nor by a brain. That might be clear later. An apparent brain will only filtered the consciousness (related to arithmetical truth) to make it differentiating on all (relative) computations. > > The next step is to consider running a simulation that depends on the outcome > of a spin measurement in the real world. We polarize a spin the positive > x-direction and measure the z-component, feed the result of the measurement > in the simulation and that then affects the simulation, the simulated person > will be made aware of something that is different depending on the outcome of > the measurement. > > The moment this experiment has been set up and is ready to go, the time > evolution of the entire system that includes the experimental set up., the > computer and everything else that is of relevance, is fixed. But this time > evolution will bring the system into a superposition of the two experimental > outcomes of the measurements and its consequences for the simulation. > > It then seems to be a matter of belief in the MWI whether or not one should > believe if both possibilities happen or if only one of them is going to be > real. But if we accept strong AI, then we have to accept that the physical > state of the system before the measurement is performed, will also generated > the consciousness of the person after the measurement. Because the > information present in the physical state before the measurement contains > both branches, it generates the consciousness of the two versions of the > person in both branches. Yes. That is why Bohm-de Broglie is so weird. It leads to a very curious sort of zombie; having no body (no particles), no soul/consciousness (according to Bohm). Yet those zombies can act purposefully to change the outcome, by a physical FTL action, in a way we cannot predict nor use (as we cannot know the initial value of the particles attributes). That adds a lot of magic in both matter and mind. To be sure, Bohm is already aware this imposed a non-computationalist theory of mind. > > Finally, one can argue that the conclusion applies to real persons that are > not simulated by computers, because the brain computes us, and in the above > argument it doesn't matter if you use a computer or a biological brain. In > fact one needs to appeal to the entire environment containing the computer, > and to get to a rigorous argument this has to be taken as large as the size > of the lightcone starting from the moment the simulation starts. OK. Bruno > > Saibal > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
