From: *Jason Resch* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
* why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
Interpretation? I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf
is just epistemic, and/or that we have some holes in the CI which
have yet to be resolved. AG *
1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
sometimes, or only at certain scales)
Well no, it is an interpretation of the SE, involving the reification of
the wave function. So it is not 'just' the Schrödinger equation.
2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
Maybe the collapse is real.
3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
reversible (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not
require faster than light influences nor retrocausalities
MWI is still a non-local theory. FTL influences or not, QM is
intrinsically non-local.
4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real"
with MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of
quantum computers (now up to 51 qubits)
Rubbish. The functioning of quantum computers is not dependent on MWI.
Many worlds is, after all, only an interpretation. Not the reality of
anything at all.
5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices
Which version of the CI are you referring to? There are as many
"Copenhagen Interpretations" as there are citizens of Copenhagen. Bohr's
original theory did not refer to observers or make experiments central.
He merely thought that quantum phenomena were understandable only in the
context of a classical world.
6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
containing all possible observers and observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of
Nothing <http://www.hpcoders.com.au/theory-of-nothing.pdf>, Chapter 7
and Appendix D).
Unfortunately, Russell's attempt to derive quantum mechanics from the
plenum of all possible bit strings failed at the first step. So you
don't have much support from this.
Given #6, we should revise our view
But we don't have #6. See the discussion I had with Russell on this list
some time ago. He had to admit that his derivation of QM failed.
It is not MWI and QM that should convince us of many worlds, but
rather the assumption of many worlds (an infinite and infinitely
varied reality) that gives us, and */explains /*all the weirdness of QM.
No, the weirdness of the violation of the Bell inequalities and
non-locality remains, even in MWI.
This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type everything theories
over any single-universe interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is
not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation. With the
assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
I think other possibilities are still available, and generally more
acceptable.
MWI has problems of its own. Particularly with the preferred basis
problem and the derivation of Born's rule from within many worlds in a
non-circular way.
Bruce
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