From: *smitra* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>

On 16-07-2018 23:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

    On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


            I would like to think that this were the case, but you
            keep coming up with irrelevancies that contradict the
            straightforward account of these phenomena. If you forget
            about the metaphysics and just concentrate on Alice and
            Bob making real measurements and recording them in their
            lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are
            no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved
            worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he
            intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument.
            In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than
            allow for the possibility of a local hidden variable
            account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is
            local -- that would still have to be established by
            developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has
            to date developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem
            has not been deflected, we do not have to worry about such
            contingencies.



        So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when
        trying to defend John Clark who claimed that there are still
        FTL influence in Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations
        implies FTL only when we assume unique outcomes of the
        experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden
        variable).

        No need of patronizing remark either, especially when
        rephrasing what I was just saying. If you agree that there is
        no FTL in the many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I
        was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you defended it,
        especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no
        problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox.
        You might eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s
        task is still incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from
        all computations, as seen from some self-referential modes
        (fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).


    Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
    that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

    Brent


It reduces the non-locality to trivial common cause effects. Bruce has been trying to prove that it doesn't by invoking the argument that you can pick a single branch where Alice and Bob wrote their measurement results in their lab books, and that one should therefore be allowed to apply Bell's theorem by pretending that the other branches do not exist and reach the same conclusion as in collapse theories. However, one has to ask here what the violation of Bell's inequalities implies. It only constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM".

It has become clear that the real argument by advocates of MWI is that many-worlds deflects Bell's theorem, so that its implications do not apply in MWI. I have, as Saibal points out, been arguing against this, and I still consider my proof that selecting one branch out of the MWI superposition is sufficient to apply Bell's theorem in its full rigour. Since the argument applies to any branch, it applies to the superposition as a whole, and MWI does not avoid the implications of Bell's theorem. The implication is that no local hidden variable theory can account for the observed EPR-type correlations. In particular, any common cause, or Bertlmann's socks type argument, fails in MWI for the same reasons that it fails in a single world account.

I have no idea what Saibal means when he claims that Bell's theorem only constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM". Saibal has not offered any convincing counter argument to my proof that Bell's theorem applies in MWI.


If we assume that, in general (and not just in case of Bell-type experiments) measurement results are deterministic, that they are specified by hidden variables, then the violation of Bell's inequality implies constraints on such theories. Such theories must necessarily be non-local. But then there is no evidence for a hidden variable theory, so there is no need to invoke non-locality on these grounds.

That does not follow. Just because you think you have shown that Bell's theorem does not apply, it does not follow that MWI is thereby local, or that a local account of the correlations is available in MWI. Similarly, the claim that there are no hidden variables says nothing at all about whether reality is local or non-local.


Now, what is true is that if Alice and Bob perform measurements on entangled spins such that their results are perfectly correlated and they are space-like separated, that the non-existence of local hidden variables has a non-local aspect to it because Bob has the information about what Alice will find and the non-existence of local hidden variables rules out that this piece of information is not somehow present locally at Alice's location.

??

But this non-local effect is entirely due to a correlation mediated by the entangled spins, in the MWI this is a common cause effect,

Bell's theorem rules out Bertlmann's socks as an explanation. You seem to accept that my argument establishes that Bell's theorem is valid in any branch of the MWI superposition. It follows that Bertlmann's socks is invalid in all branches, so the possibility of a common cause effect is ruled out in MWI, just as it is ruled out in any single-world interpretation.

while in the Copenhagen interpretation it cannot be explained in that way.

Why not? Many-worlds and single-worlds are entirely equivalent in this respect -- they both have the same wave function, after all!

Bruce's elaborate argument about verifying the violation of Bell's inequality in single branches doesn't change that conclusion. Yes, you can verify that Bell's inequality is violated in single branches, but as pointed out above, that violation is part of the argument why in the MWI the non-local aspects of entangled states are completely trivial.

That does not follow. If you want to advocate a common cause explanation in MWI you have to actually develop the corresponding dynamical theory-- i.e., what is the common cause and how is it implemented? If you simply appeal to the nature of the singlet wave function for entangled states, then you have not given a local account since, as Maudlin correctly points out, the wave function itself is intrinsically non-local. It seems that you are talking out of both sides of your mouth here -- QM is non-local, but the non-locality is entirely trivial in MWI?????

Bruce

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