On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up
with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of
these phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just
concentrate on Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording
them in their lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There
are no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved worlds, and
Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does
not invalidate Bell's argument. In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem
would do no more than allow for the possibility of a local hidden
variable account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is local
-- that would still have to be established by developing such a local
hidden variable theory. No one has to date developed such a theory.
But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, we do not have to
worry about such contingencies.
So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to
defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in
Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we
assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or
Bohm’s type of hidden variable).
No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what
I was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the
many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark.
Not sure why you defended it, especially that you have shown
implicitly that you have no problem with the step 3 of the Universal
Dovetailer Paradox. You might eventually understand that with
mechanism, Everett’s task is still incomplete, as we need to justify
the wave from all computations, as seen from some self-referential
modes (fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).
Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.
Brent
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