> On 26 Jul 2018, at 21:45, Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> On 25 Jul 2018, at 16:36, Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 10:47 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> On 7/24/2018 7:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 7:47 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 7/24/2018 7:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 23, 2018, 10:44 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7/23/2018 8:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> > Other mathematics might work, but this seems to be the absolute >>>> > simplest and with the least assumptions. It comes from pure >>>> > mathematical truth concerning integers. You don't need set theory, or >>>> > reals, or machines with infinite tapes. You just need a single >>>> > equation, which needs math no more advanced than whats taught in >>>> > elementary school. I can't imagine a TOE that could assume less. >>>> >>>> It might be interesting except that it executes all possible >>>> algorithms. Another instance of proving too much. >>>> >>>> Now if you would find the diophantine equations that compute this world >>>> and only this world that would be something. >>>> >>>> Well for you to have a valid doubt regarding the everything predicted to >>>> exist by all computations, you would need to show why you expect each >>>> individual being within that everything should also be able to see >>>> everything. >>> >>> So if I tell you everything described in every novel ever written really >>> happened, but on a different planets (many also called "Earth") you >>> couldn't doubt that unless you could show that you should have been able to >>> see all those novels play out. >>> >>> If a theory predicts that everything exists, and also explains why you >>> shouldn't expect to see everything even though everything exists, then you >>> can't use your inability to see everything that exists as a criticism of >>> the theory. >> >> However, I can use the incoherence of "everything exists" to reject it. >> >> You could, but Robinson arithmetic is fairly coherent, in my opinion. > > Indeed. Robinso Arithmetic, or Shoenfinkel-Curry combinator theory proves the > existence of a quantum universal dovetailer. Of course that does not solve > the mind-body problem, we have still to extract it from self-reference to > distinguish qualia and quanta. > > If some people are interested, I can show how the two axioms Kxy = x and Sxyz > (+ few legality axioms and rules, but without classical logic (unlike Robison > arithmetic) gives a Turing complete theory. I have all this fresh in my head > because I have just finished a thorough course on this. Combinators are also > interesting to explain what is a computation and for differentiating > different sorts of computation, including already sort of “physical > computation”. Yet it would be treachery to use this directly. To distinguish > 3p and 1p, and 3-1 quanta with 1-p qualia, we need to extract them from Löb’s > formula, and use Löbian combinators. I will probably type a summary here. > > > I would be very interested in this. I am still making my way through "To Mock > a Mockingbird". Thanks!
Nice. I will begin soon a new thread “What is a computation?”. I will first recall the key idea, so that people understand we don’t need a formal definition of computation to understand that the notion of universal computability entails directly incompleteness. Then I will introduce three formal notions of (universal) computation, andI will begin with the combinators. I might go a little bit farer than “To mock a mocking bird”. Then I might illustrate all this with the better known notion of Turing machine, and says some words on the Diophantine Polynomials too. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
