> On 30 Sep 2018, at 11:58, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 30, 2018 at 9:40:07 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 29 Sep 2018, at 13:34, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 7:16:41 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 21:00, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 6:49:37 PM UTC, [email protected] >>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you everybody for your responses. >>> >>> Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but >>> some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computer >>> Here for example (4min video) Edelman: >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc >>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc> >>> >>> The question can be turned around. Why would anyone think a brain is >>> strongly comparable or identical to a computer? It has some superficial >>> similarities such as being able to store memory and logical functions >>> (which are simulated by a computer), but its cells are not two state >>> systems like computer transistors. AG >> >> >> A bacteria is already a computer (at least), >> >> >> Really? Then you should be able to identify the entities that store binary >> information. > > > By computer I mean a number u such that phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y), for some > enumeration phi_i of the partial computable function. No need of binary > information. But it needs digitally coded information, and that is given by > the genome (the sequence of adenine, thymine, cytosine, guanine (French > spelling, sorry). > > So now a computer isn't some device that executes programs, but a number? > Please elaborate on your mathematics. I have no idea what it is supposed to > mean. AG
I already did. See the thread “why is Church’s thesis a miracle”. I can explain again, but right now I have some work to finish. In a nutshell, choose your favorite Turing universal formalism, enumerate in that formalisme the code of the partial computable functions, and thus (with repetition) the partial computable functions themselves phi_i, fix a bijection between NxN and N <x, y>, then a number u is universal if phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y). u is the computer, x the program, and y the data. We say that u emulates x on y. Bruno >> And where is the clock which pulses and advances the instruction pointer? >> And where is the instruction pointer located? AG > > Dont confuse a computer (universal number, universal Turing machine, …) and > a von Neumann physical computer. Reread my explanation in the thread “why is > Church’s thesis a miracle). Ask me question from there. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> and a neurone is already a rather sophisticated society of bacteria and >> viruses, plausibly enough. So, a society of billions of neurons should not >> be compared to transistors. The substitution level is plausibly much lower >> than the level of neurons. >> >> But we don’t know in Nature anything which at some level is not emulable by >> a computer, except for controversial notion like >> >> A) primary matter (if that exists, it is not emulable by a computer) >> B) the reduction of the wave packet (if that exists, it is provably not >> emulable by a computer). >> >> But there are no evidence neither for A) nor for B). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Please give me your thought on that. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
