On Friday, March 15, 2019 at 5:18:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 14 Mar 2019, at 14:03, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 7:54:49 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> *> We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current 
>>> events, know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is 
>>> an open question. *
>>>
>>
>> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without 
>> reservation that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will 
>> *never* be creative because the word "creative" now means whatever 
>> computers aren't good at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved 
>> programing the meaning of the word constantly changes. What was creative 
>> yesterday isn't creative today.
>>
>> *> On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of 
>>> language, and languages change.*
>>>
>>
>> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is) then it can not be 
>> used to construct things, in particular it can't, by itself without the use 
>> of matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims it can. English is 
>> also a language but an English word has no meaning without an English 
>> speaker with a physical brain to hear it.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>
>
>
> There is some AI art that sells at galleries
>
>    
> https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter
>
> but that's about it I've seen.
>
> Turing machines in theoretical computing/math books are all fictional 
> things, of course.
>
>
> “Of course”?
>
>
>
>
> All actual computers are made of matter.
>
>
> No doubt that this is true, but that is not an argument that such matter 
> are not (stable) appearances.
>
> But as I try to explain here from times to times, the arithmetical reality 
> explains where and why such stable appearances appears. If I can say.
>
> You just seem to be a believer in a Primary Matter, but I have never seen 
> one evidence for it. Initially, “mathematician” were not believer in a 
> mathematical reality, but a skeptic toward the idea that matter is the 
> primitive reality we have to assume. But with mechanism, we don’t have to 
> assume matter, it explains matter, and unlike physicalism, it explains how 
> consciousness remains associated to the appearances of matter.
>
> You seem to beg the question by deciding that math objects are fiction and 
> physics object is not.
>
> No problem, but then digital mechanism is false. But there are no 
> evidences, it is just an old habit since the closure of Plato academy;
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

One could also look at it as a pragmatist.

Say I want to *make something*. I could say "I want to make it out of 
arithmetic (numbers)." But ways to actually do that is something like to 
write a program where "numbers" do things in a computer. But we know what 
is going on here is electrons moving through circuits and pixels.

It could be "running" in my brain (assuming I can imagine the program 
executing). But that does nobody else any good.

Or I could type it up and file it away for later on a hard drive.

Electrons, circuits, pixels, brain cells, hard drives. Matter.

On whether some ultimate Löb-Gödel theorem prover can "explain" self-aware 
experiences: I still think that there are non-numerical first-class 
experiential entities that are needed to completely "flesh out" true 
experience. (And those can only come from matter.)


- pt 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to