On Friday, March 15, 2019 at 5:18:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 14 Mar 2019, at 14:03, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 7:54:49 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >>> *> We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current >>> events, know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is >>> an open question. * >>> >> >> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without >> reservation that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will >> *never* be creative because the word "creative" now means whatever >> computers aren't good at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved >> programing the meaning of the word constantly changes. What was creative >> yesterday isn't creative today. >> >> *> On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of >>> language, and languages change.* >>> >> >> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is) then it can not be >> used to construct things, in particular it can't, by itself without the use >> of matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims it can. English is >> also a language but an English word has no meaning without an English >> speaker with a physical brain to hear it. >> >> John K Clark >> > > > > There is some AI art that sells at galleries > > > https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter > > but that's about it I've seen. > > Turing machines in theoretical computing/math books are all fictional > things, of course. > > > “Of course”? > > > > > All actual computers are made of matter. > > > No doubt that this is true, but that is not an argument that such matter > are not (stable) appearances. > > But as I try to explain here from times to times, the arithmetical reality > explains where and why such stable appearances appears. If I can say. > > You just seem to be a believer in a Primary Matter, but I have never seen > one evidence for it. Initially, “mathematician” were not believer in a > mathematical reality, but a skeptic toward the idea that matter is the > primitive reality we have to assume. But with mechanism, we don’t have to > assume matter, it explains matter, and unlike physicalism, it explains how > consciousness remains associated to the appearances of matter. > > You seem to beg the question by deciding that math objects are fiction and > physics object is not. > > No problem, but then digital mechanism is false. But there are no > evidences, it is just an old habit since the closure of Plato academy; > > Bruno > > >
One could also look at it as a pragmatist. Say I want to *make something*. I could say "I want to make it out of arithmetic (numbers)." But ways to actually do that is something like to write a program where "numbers" do things in a computer. But we know what is going on here is electrons moving through circuits and pixels. It could be "running" in my brain (assuming I can imagine the program executing). But that does nobody else any good. Or I could type it up and file it away for later on a hard drive. Electrons, circuits, pixels, brain cells, hard drives. Matter. On whether some ultimate Löb-Gödel theorem prover can "explain" self-aware experiences: I still think that there are non-numerical first-class experiential entities that are needed to completely "flesh out" true experience. (And those can only come from matter.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
