On 5/2/2019 8:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 1 May 2019, at 18:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 5/1/2019 1:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand. By definition, the substitution level take into
account all what is relevant.
But definitions don't call the definidum into existence.??
Indeed. But I did not use a definition to claim any truth (of existence, or
else). Mechanism assumes that you have a brain, that computer exists
physically, that doctors exist, etc.
It does not assume that the physical existence is primary, though, and
eventually, the reasoning shows that the physical existence (which is never
doubted) is not primary.
By definition God is omnipotent.??
By*some* definition.
But that doesn't mean there's an omnipotent being.
On the contrary indeed. Nothing is omnipotent. Omnipotence and omniscience are
two inconsistent notions, even when taken in isolation.
I am not sure what was your point here Brent?
You wrote, "By definition, the substitution level take into account all what is
relevant." My point is that Holevo's theorem entails that there is lower bound on
the incompleteness of the substitution; so it is not at all clear that there is a
substitution level that takes into account all that is relevant. Simply saying there is
a definition of the term doesn't mean it refers.
Yes, so Mechanism might implied that we (as abstract immaterial
computational object) are above the Holevo bound. Simply. But now,
this is incorrect. Even if we need to go below that bound, like if we
have a quantum brain, there is still a possibility that we don’t use
the continuous information related to it, so we will still be
“reconstituted” in the arithmetical reality, and the reversal
physics/psychology-theology still occurs.
Mechanism would be false, if not only we are quantum machine, but some
infinite information is relevant, and if that infinite information is
not recoverable by the first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. In
that case mechanism is false, and materialism is against consistent
(but not yet necessarily true, note).
There is nothing in Holevo's theorem that implies the information is
infinite. Only that it is unobtainable. Mechanism might still be
true. We don't know what detail is needed so that one "feels the same"
after replacing part or all ones brain by some Turing machine. It might
be be very little. One the other hand it might makes the fact that one
has been duplicated obvious even if you still "felt" ("reported"?) you
were the same person. So I'm not clear on why you think your
duplication scenario is significant.
Brent
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