> On 28 Apr 2019, at 17:47, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > "Brain" doesn't exist. "Brain" is just an idea in consciousness. Therefore, > your entire theory is false.
That is weird. The fact that the brain does not exist “ontologically” is a consequence of mechanism, so you criticise the theory at the place it agrees with your own approach. Mechanism assumes of course that brain, and doctor, and physical computers, do exist in some other sense, like the phenomenological sense. > "Brain" is just a picture that you see in your consciousness, no different > than the picture "unicorn”. No. It is not because something exist only phenomenologically that it does not obey precise laws, like the numbers, or the physical reality. > Believing in "brain" only because you see it, is like believing in "unicorn" > only because you see it. No sound universal machine would believe in the ontological experience from just seeing something. But if you reject the phenomenological existence, then your theory is at default with all experiences. > And then you start to make abstract theories totally unconnected to reality: > "If you put your consciousness into a unicorn, then you will be able to fly > on the rainbows". > > Happy fantasizing! I don’t think you are serious. You might have read the post much to quickly. You seem to confuse ontology and phenomenology. With mechanism, we cannot assume more than the additive and multiplicative structure of the natural numbers, and explains consciousness and the illusion of matter from there. We agree on the key importance of self-reference, and on the conclusion, but you seem unaware that self-reference is where theoretical computer science and mathematical logic explain the most, and introduce many nuances. Bruno > > On Sunday, 28 April 2019 18:33:30 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Indexical Digital Mechanism, or simply Mechanism, is the idea that we can > survive with an artificial brain. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
